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From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 16/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF
Date: Fri, 9 May 2025 11:28:35 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250509162839.3057217-17-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250509162839.3057217-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>

Use attack vector controls to determine if L1TF mitigation is required.

Disable SMT if cross-thread protection is desired.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 6a4bc80be1e9..19a176369b22 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2697,17 +2697,23 @@ static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
 		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
-		if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
-			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
-		else
-			l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+	if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+		return;
+
+	if (!should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
 	}
+
+	if (smt_mitigations == SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON)
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+	else
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
 }
 
 static void __init l1tf_apply_mitigation(void)
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-05-09 16:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-09 16:28 [PATCH v5 00/20] Attack vector controls (part 2) David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 01/20] Documentation/x86: Document new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 02/20] cpu: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-05-21 15:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 03/20] x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector support David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 04/20] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 05/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 06/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 07/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 08/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 09/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 10/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 11/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 12/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 13/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 14/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI David Kaplan
2025-06-30 12:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-01  3:27     ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-01 11:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-02 18:24         ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-03 10:01           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 15/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 17/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 18/20] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTI David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 19/20] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 20/20] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs David Kaplan
2025-06-30 16:40 ` [PATCH v5 00/20] Attack vector controls (part 2) Borislav Petkov
2025-07-01  3:27   ` Kaplan, David

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