From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: "Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 14/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI
Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2025 12:01:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250703100155.GAaGZVEwI9BWv9Cwjs@fat_crate.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <LV3PR12MB9265FD7451212DFA64F8B4009440A@LV3PR12MB9265.namprd12.prod.outlook.com>
On Wed, Jul 02, 2025 at 06:24:31PM +0000, Kaplan, David wrote:
> So probably the right answer here is to split this up. I'll change the
> patch to just use the existing mitigations and structure it like your
> snippet above. If someone wants to add a new user->kernel only option for
> BHI, that can be done in a separate patch later. There's actually probably
> several other mitigations that could similarly be split up based on attack
> vector (e.g. have separate controls for VERW in various places), if we
> wanted to have more mitigation options based on attack vectors (instead of
> just a simple on/off).
Yeah, the thought that our mitigations are not really consistent wrt vectors
did cross my mind. We should definitely keep this in mind and perhaps
restructure them into a common pattern later, if it turns beneficial.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-03 10:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-09 16:28 [PATCH v5 00/20] Attack vector controls (part 2) David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 01/20] Documentation/x86: Document new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 02/20] cpu: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-05-21 15:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 03/20] x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector support David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 04/20] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 05/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 06/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 07/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 08/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 09/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 10/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 11/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 12/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 13/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 14/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI David Kaplan
2025-06-30 12:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-01 3:27 ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-01 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-02 18:24 ` Kaplan, David
2025-07-03 10:01 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 15/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 16/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 17/20] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 18/20] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTI David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 19/20] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-05-09 16:28 ` [PATCH v5 20/20] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs David Kaplan
2025-06-30 16:40 ` [PATCH v5 00/20] Attack vector controls (part 2) Borislav Petkov
2025-07-01 3:27 ` Kaplan, David
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