From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: chao.gao@intel.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
hpa@zytor.com, john.allen@amd.com, mingo@redhat.com,
minipli@grsecurity.net, mlevitsk@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, seanjc@google.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, weijiang.yang@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
xin@zytor.com
Subject: [PATCH v13 13/21] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 06:30:47 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250821133132.72322-14-chao.gao@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250821133132.72322-1-chao.gao@intel.com>
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Save constant values to HOST_{S_CET,SSP,INTR_SSP_TABLE} field explicitly.
Kernel IBT is supported and the setting in MSR_IA32_S_CET is static after
post-boot(The exception is BIOS call case but vCPU thread never across it)
and KVM doesn't need to refresh HOST_S_CET field before every VM-Enter/
VM-Exit sequence.
Host supervisor shadow stack is not enabled now and SSP is not accessible
to kernel mode, thus it's safe to set host IA32_INT_SSP_TAB/SSP VMCS field
to 0s. When shadow stack is enabled for CPL3, SSP is reloaded from PL3_SSP
before it exits to userspace. Check SDM Vol 2A/B Chapter 3/4 for SYSCALL/
SYSRET/SYSENTER SYSEXIT/RDSSP/CALL etc.
Prevent KVM module loading if host supervisor shadow stack SHSTK_EN is set
in MSR_IA32_S_CET as KVM cannot co-exit with it correctly.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 5316c27f6099..7d290b2cb0f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void)
return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
}
+static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
+{
+ return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+}
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
{
return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index adf5af30e537..e8155635cb42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4320,6 +4320,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, kvm_host.efer);
+
+ /*
+ * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
+ * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
+ * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
+ * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
+ * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
+ * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
+ * 3 and 4 for details.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet);
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
+ }
}
void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index dfd94146846e..34e4b2c4b892 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9893,6 +9893,18 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
return -EIO;
}
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet);
+ /*
+ * Linux doesn't yet support supervisor shadow stacks (SSS), so
+ * KVM doesn't save/restore the associated MSRs, i.e. KVM may
+ * clobber the host values. Yell and refuse to load if SSS is
+ * unexpectedly enabled, e.g. to avoid crashing the host.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_host.s_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN))
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
memset(&kvm_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_caps));
x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 256e59aa9359..27fec4ed4c4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct kvm_host_values {
u64 efer;
u64 xcr0;
u64 xss;
+ u64 s_cet;
u64 arch_capabilities;
};
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-21 13:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-21 13:30 [PATCH v13 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 01/21] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-08-28 12:58 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-29 0:43 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-29 22:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 02/21] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-08-29 6:37 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 03/21] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-08-29 6:47 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-29 10:40 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 04/21] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-08-29 7:05 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-29 10:29 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 05/21] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-25 1:52 ` Xin Li
2025-08-25 2:55 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-26 6:54 ` Xin Li
2025-09-09 8:18 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-09 20:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-10 2:55 ` Chao Gao
2025-08-27 4:56 ` Xin Li
2025-08-27 15:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 06/21] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 07/21] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 08/21] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 09/21] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 10/21] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 11/21] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 12/21] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 14/21] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 15/21] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 16/21] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 17/21] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 19/21] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 20/21] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 21/21] KVM: selftest: Add tests for KVM_{GET,SET}_ONE_REG Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:35 ` [PATCH v13 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20250821133132.72322-14-chao.gao@intel.com \
--to=chao.gao@intel.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=john.allen@amd.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=minipli@grsecurity.net \
--cc=mlevitsk@redhat.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=xin@zytor.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®