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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: chao.gao@intel.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, john.allen@amd.com, mingo@redhat.com,
	minipli@grsecurity.net, mlevitsk@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, seanjc@google.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, weijiang.yang@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	xin@zytor.com, Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v13 08/21] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 06:30:42 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250821133132.72322-9-chao.gao@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250821133132.72322-1-chao.gao@intel.com>

From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>

Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) is a kind of CPU feature used
to prevent Return/CALL/Jump-Oriented Programming (ROP/COP/JOP) attacks.
It provides two sub-features(SHSTK,IBT) to defend against ROP/COP/JOP
style control-flow subversion attacks.

Shadow Stack (SHSTK):
  A shadow stack is a second stack used exclusively for control transfer
  operations. The shadow stack is separate from the data/normal stack and
  can be enabled individually in user and kernel mode. When shadow stack
  is enabled, CALL pushes the return address on both the data and shadow
  stack. RET pops the return address from both stacks and compares them.
  If the return addresses from the two stacks do not match, the processor
  generates a #CP.

Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT):
  IBT introduces instruction(ENDBRANCH)to mark valid target addresses of
  indirect branches (CALL, JMP etc...). If an indirect branch is executed
  and the next instruction is _not_ an ENDBRANCH, the processor generates
  a #CP. These instruction behaves as a NOP on platforms that have no CET.

Several new CET MSRs are defined to support CET:
  MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET: CET settings for {user,supervisor} CET respectively.

  MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP: SHSTK pointer linear address for CPL{0,1,2,3}.

  MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: Linear address of SHSTK pointer table, whose entry
			is indexed by IST of interrupt gate desc.

Two XSAVES state bits are introduced for CET:
  IA32_XSS:[bit 11]: Control saving/restoring user mode CET states
  IA32_XSS:[bit 12]: Control saving/restoring supervisor mode CET states.

Six VMCS fields are introduced for CET:
  {HOST,GUEST}_S_CET: Stores CET settings for kernel mode.
  {HOST,GUEST}_SSP: Stores current active SSP.
  {HOST,GUEST}_INTR_SSP_TABLE: Stores current active MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB.

On Intel platforms, two additional bits are defined in VM_EXIT and VM_ENTRY
control fields:
If VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE = 1, host CET states are loaded from following
VMCS fields at VM-Exit:
  HOST_S_CET
  HOST_SSP
  HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE

If VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE = 1, guest CET states are loaded from following
VMCS fields at VM-Entry:
  GUEST_S_CET
  GUEST_SSP
  GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE

Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index cca7d6641287..ce10a7e2d3d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
 #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS                   0x00800000
 #define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP			0x01000000
 #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL		0x02000000
+#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE                  0x10000000
 
 #define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR	0x00036dff
 
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@
 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS                   0x00010000
 #define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP			0x00020000
 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL		0x00040000
+#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE                 0x00100000
 
 #define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR	0x000011ff
 
@@ -369,6 +371,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 	GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS    = 0x00006822,
 	GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP              = 0x00006824,
 	GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP              = 0x00006826,
+	GUEST_S_CET                     = 0x00006828,
+	GUEST_SSP                       = 0x0000682a,
+	GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE            = 0x0000682c,
 	HOST_CR0                        = 0x00006c00,
 	HOST_CR3                        = 0x00006c02,
 	HOST_CR4                        = 0x00006c04,
@@ -381,6 +386,9 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 	HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP          = 0x00006c12,
 	HOST_RSP                        = 0x00006c14,
 	HOST_RIP                        = 0x00006c16,
+	HOST_S_CET                      = 0x00006c18,
+	HOST_SSP                        = 0x00006c1a,
+	HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE             = 0x00006c1c
 };
 
 /*
-- 
2.47.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-21 13:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-21 13:30 [PATCH v13 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 01/21] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-08-28 12:58   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-29  0:43     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-29 22:01       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 02/21] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-08-29  6:37   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 03/21] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-08-29  6:47   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-29 10:40     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 04/21] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-08-29  7:05   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-29 10:29     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 05/21] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-25  1:52   ` Xin Li
2025-08-25  2:55     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-26  6:54       ` Xin Li
2025-09-09  8:18       ` Chao Gao
2025-09-09 20:03         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-10  2:55           ` Chao Gao
2025-08-27  4:56   ` Xin Li
2025-08-27 15:09     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 06/21] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 07/21] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 09/21] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 10/21] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 11/21] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 12/21] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 13/21] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 14/21] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 15/21] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 16/21] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 17/21] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 19/21] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 20/21] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 21/21] KVM: selftest: Add tests for KVM_{GET,SET}_ONE_REG Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:35 ` [PATCH v13 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao

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