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From: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, john.allen@amd.com,
	mingo@redhat.com, minipli@grsecurity.net, mlevitsk@redhat.com,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	seanjc@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, weijiang.yang@intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 05/21] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs
Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2025 23:54:46 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2ed04dff-e778-46c6-bd5f-51295763af06@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aKvP2AHKYeQCPm0x@intel.com>

On 8/24/2025 7:55 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
>> static bool is_xstate_managed_msr(u32 index)
>> {
>>          if (!kvm_caps.supported_xss)
>>                  return false;
>>
>>          switch (index) {
>>          case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
>>          case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
>>          case MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
>>                  return kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER &&
>>                         kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL;
>>          default:
>>                  return false;
> This will duplicate checks in other functions. I slightly prefer to keep this
> function super simple and do all capability checks in __kvm_{set,get}_msr()
> or kvm_emulate_msr_{write,read}.
> 
>>          }
>> }
>>
>> And it would be obvious how to add new MSRs related to other XFEATURE bits.
> Just return true for all those MSRs, regardless of host capabilities. If
> kvm_caps doesn't support them, those MSRs are not advertised to userspace
> either (see kvm_probe_msr_to_save()). Loading or putting the guest FPU when
> userspace attempts to read/write those unsupported MSRs shouldn't cause any
> performance issues, as userspace is unlikely to access them in hot paths.

There is no problem as of now, because there are only two CET related bits
set in KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS.  So if !CET, the two bits are cleared thus
kvm_caps.supported_xss is 0, and kvm_load_guest_fpu() is never executed in
__msr_io().

However after any new bit is added to KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS in future, if !CET,
kvm_caps.supported_xss could be non-zero.  There should still be no problem
because we don't expect any access to CET MSRs.

The trouble comes with MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP when FRED and !CET, because it will
be accessed even !CET.  And we need to have to do the following:

static bool is_xstate_managed_msr(u32 index)
{
	switch (index) {
	case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
	case MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
		return true;
	case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP:
		return kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER &&
		       kvm_caps.supported_xss & XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL;
	default:
		return false;
	}
}

Then it makes more sense to handle all CET MSRs consistently.

Thanks!
      Xin


  reply	other threads:[~2025-08-26  6:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-21 13:30 [PATCH v13 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 01/21] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-08-28 12:58   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-29  0:43     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-29 22:01       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 02/21] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-08-29  6:37   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 03/21] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-08-29  6:47   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-29 10:40     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 04/21] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-08-29  7:05   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-08-29 10:29     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 05/21] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-25  1:52   ` Xin Li
2025-08-25  2:55     ` Chao Gao
2025-08-26  6:54       ` Xin Li [this message]
2025-09-09  8:18       ` Chao Gao
2025-09-09 20:03         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-10  2:55           ` Chao Gao
2025-08-27  4:56   ` Xin Li
2025-08-27 15:09     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 06/21] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 07/21] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 08/21] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 09/21] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 10/21] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 11/21] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 12/21] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 13/21] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 14/21] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 15/21] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 16/21] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 17/21] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 19/21] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 20/21] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:30 ` [PATCH v13 21/21] KVM: selftest: Add tests for KVM_{GET,SET}_ONE_REG Chao Gao
2025-08-21 13:35 ` [PATCH v13 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao

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