[PATCH RFC v1 20/20] KVM: selftests: Add APX state handling and XCR0 sanity checks

["Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>]

Now that KVM exposes the APX feature to guests on APX-capable systems,
extend the selftests to validate XCR0 configuration and state management.

Since APX repurposes the XSAVE area previously used by MPX in the
non-compacted format, add a check to ensure that MPX states are not set
when APX is enabled.

Also, load non-init APX state data in the guest so that XSTATE_BV[APX] is
set, allowing validation of APX state testing.

Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
---
 .../selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h     |  1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c  |  6 ++++++
 .../selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c       | 20 +++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
index 51cd84b9ca66..dde7af40584e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ struct xstate {
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR		BIT_ULL(15)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_CFG		BIT_ULL(17)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA	BIT_ULL(18)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_APX		BIT_ULL(19)
 
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512		(XFEATURE_MASK_OPMASK | \
 					 XFEATURE_MASK_ZMM_Hi256 | \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c
index 141b7fc0c965..6d1dc575b22b 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/state_test.c
@@ -167,6 +167,12 @@ static void __attribute__((__flatten__)) guest_code(void *arg)
 			asm volatile ("vmovupd %0, %%zmm16" :: "m" (buffer));
 		}
 
+		if (supported_xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_APX) {
+			/* mov $0xcccccccc, %r16 */
+			asm volatile (".byte 0xd5, 0x18, 0xb8, 0xcc, 0xcc,"
+				      "0xcc, 0xcc, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00");
+		}
+
 		if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) {
 			uint64_t bounds[2] = { 10, 0xffffffffull };
 			uint64_t output[2] = { };
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c
index d038c1571729..6e4f2f83c831 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/xcr0_cpuid_test.c
@@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ do {									\
 		       __supported, (xfeatures));			\
 } while (0)
 
+/*
+ * Verify that mutually exclusive architectural features do not overlap.
+ * For example, APX and MPX must never be reported as supported together.
+ */
+#define ASSERT_XFEATURE_CONFLICT(supported_xcr0, xfeatures, conflicts)			\
+do {											\
+	uint64_t __supported = (supported_xcr0) & ((xfeatures) | (conflicts));		\
+											\
+	__GUEST_ASSERT((__supported & (xfeatures)) != (xfeatures) ||			\
+		       !(__supported & (conflicts)),					\
+		       "supported = 0x%lx, xfeatures = 0x%llx, conflicts = 0x%llx",	\
+		       __supported, (xfeatures), (conflicts));				\
+} while (0)
+
+
 static void guest_code(void)
 {
 	uint64_t initial_xcr0;
@@ -79,6 +94,11 @@ static void guest_code(void)
 	ASSERT_ALL_OR_NONE_XFEATURE(supported_xcr0,
 				    XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE);
 
+	/* Check APX by ensuring MPX is not exposed concurrently */
+	ASSERT_XFEATURE_CONFLICT(supported_xcr0,
+				 XFEATURE_MASK_APX,
+				 XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);
+
 	vector = xsetbv_safe(0, XFEATURE_MASK_FP);
 	__GUEST_ASSERT(!vector,
 		       "Expected success on XSETBV(FP), got %s",
-- 
2.51.0