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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>,
	Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>, Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>,
	ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>,
	ocfs2-devel@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata
Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 14:40:22 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260518144022.4d0d0056d304d5fd9607bc10@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260517111015.3187935-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com>

On Sun, 17 May 2026 07:10:11 -0400 Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> wrote:

> 
> This series adds three structural checks to
> ocfs2_validate_inode_block() that catch attacker-controlled bytes
> in a freshly read dinode before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies them
> verbatim into the in-core inode.  All three checks fire on the
> mount, lookup, and read-after-cache-invalidation paths and reject
> the block with ocfs2_error(), the same error-propagation
> mechanism the existing suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list,
> and refcount checks use.

Thanks.  Sashiko review might have found a few issues:
	https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260517111015.3187935-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-18 21:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-17 11:10 Michael Bommarito
2026-05-17 11:10 ` [PATCH 1/3] ocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type or stray bits Michael Bommarito
2026-05-18  1:36   ` Joseph Qi
2026-05-17 11:10 ` [PATCH 2/3] ocfs2: reject dinodes whose i_rdev disagrees with the file type Michael Bommarito
2026-05-18  1:37   ` Joseph Qi
2026-05-17 11:10 ` [PATCH 3/3] ocfs2: reject regular files with non-zero i_size and zero i_clusters Michael Bommarito
2026-05-18  1:38   ` Joseph Qi
2026-05-18 21:40 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2026-05-19  0:57   ` [PATCH 0/3] ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata Michael Bommarito
2026-06-01 17:39 ` Joel Becker

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