From: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
To: maz@kernel.org, oupton@kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, joey.gouly@arm.com,
seiden@linux.ibm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
yuzenghui@huawei.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, steven.price@arm.com,
vdonnefort@google.com, qperret@google.com, tabba@google.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 09/18] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 12:33:29 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260914113338.159227-10-fuad.tabba@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260914113338.159227-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Extend kvm_handle_pvm_hvc64() to handle SMCCC_VERSION,
SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES and the vendor hypervisor call UID at EL2, so
these queries don't reach the host. ARCH_FEATURES is mandatory from
SMCCC 1.1, the version EL2 implements: it returns SUCCESS for itself and
for SMCCC_VERSION, NOT_SUPPORTED for anything else, and handles the
ARCH_WORKAROUND_1/2/3 queries as the host does, from a copy of the
host's mitigation state taken at init with the sanitised ID registers.
The workaround calls themselves are already handled on hyp entry.
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 4 ++
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 4 ++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
index 4974492744cc8..7609c78c68f34 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
#include <asm/sysreg.h>
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_cpu_context, kvm_hyp_ctxt);
@@ -150,6 +151,9 @@ extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64smfr0_el1_sys_val);
extern unsigned long kvm_nvhe_sym(__icache_flags);
extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_arm_vmid_bits);
+extern enum mitigation_state kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_v2_state);
+extern enum mitigation_state kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_v4_state);
+extern enum mitigation_state kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_bhb_state);
extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_host_sve_max_vl);
extern unsigned long kvm_nvhe_sym(hyp_nr_cpus);
extern unsigned int kvm_nvhe_sym(hyp_gicv3_nr_lr);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index db36815630790..cceeeee266902 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -2622,6 +2622,10 @@ static void kvm_hyp_init_symbols(void)
kvm_nvhe_sym(__icache_flags) = __icache_flags;
kvm_nvhe_sym(kvm_arm_vmid_bits) = kvm_arm_vmid_bits;
+ kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_v2_state) = arm64_get_spectre_v2_state();
+ kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_v4_state) = arm64_get_spectre_v4_state();
+ kvm_nvhe_sym(spectre_bhb_state) = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state();
+
/* Propagate the FGT state to the nVHE side */
kvm_nvhe_sym(hfgrtr_masks) = hfgrtr_masks;
kvm_nvhe_sym(hfgwtr_masks) = hfgwtr_masks;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
index 0252f28cca300..855cb77c8bba1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
#include <hyp/adjust_pc.h>
@@ -18,6 +19,11 @@
#include <nvhe/pkvm.h>
#include <nvhe/trap_handler.h>
+/* The host's Spectre mitigation state, for SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES. */
+enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_state;
+enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_state;
+enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state;
+
/* Used by icache_is_aliasing(). */
unsigned long __icache_flags;
@@ -1183,8 +1189,70 @@ bool kvm_handle_pvm_hvc64(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
{
u64 val[4] = { SMCCC_RET_INVALID_PARAMETER };
bool handled = true;
+ u32 feature;
+ uuid_t uuid;
switch (smccc_get_function(vcpu)) {
+ case ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_FUNC_ID:
+ /* Nothing to be handled by the host. Go back to the guest. */
+ val[0] = ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_1_1;
+ break;
+ case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID:
+ /* The workaround calls themselves are handled on hyp entry. */
+ val[0] = SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ feature = smccc_get_arg1(vcpu);
+ switch (feature) {
+ case ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_FUNC_ID:
+ case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID:
+ val[0] = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
+ switch (spectre_v2_state) {
+ case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+ val[0] = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
+ val[0] = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
+ switch (spectre_v4_state) {
+ case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+ /* With SSBS advertised the guest's default is safe. */
+ if (kvm_has_feat(vcpu->kvm, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SSBS, IMP))
+ break;
+ fallthrough;
+ case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
+ val[0] = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
+ switch (spectre_bhb_state) {
+ case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+ val[0] = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
+ val[0] = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_CALL_UID_FUNC_ID:
+ uuid = ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_UID_KVM;
+ val[0] = smccc_uuid_to_reg(&uuid, 0);
+ val[1] = smccc_uuid_to_reg(&uuid, 1);
+ val[2] = smccc_uuid_to_reg(&uuid, 2);
+ val[3] = smccc_uuid_to_reg(&uuid, 3);
+ break;
case ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_FEATURES_FUNC_ID:
val[0] = BIT(ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_FEATURES);
val[0] |= BIT(ARM_SMCCC_KVM_FUNC_HYP_MEMINFO);
--
2.39.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-14 11:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-14 11:33 [PATCH v3 00/18] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 01/18] KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 02/18] KVM: arm64: Validate the host vCPU's VM before reading it " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 03/18] KVM: arm64: Pin the host vCPU before adjusting its PC " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 04/18] KVM: arm64: Disable steal time for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 05/18] KVM: arm64: Introduce per-EC entry handlers for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 06/18] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 07/18] KVM: arm64: Add {flush,sync}_hyp_timer_state() primitives Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 08/18] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 10/18] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 11/18] KVM: arm64: Restrict KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and PSCI version for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 12/18] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 13:42 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-09-14 14:43 ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 13/18] KVM: arm64: Inject an UNDEF at EL2 for unhandled protected guest exits Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 14/18] KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 15/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host access to protected VM private state Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 16/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host power-on of a vCPU that EL2 holds powered off Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 17/18] KVM: arm64: Advertise the capabilities that protected VMs support Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 18/18] KVM: arm64: Document the protected VM userspace API Fuad Tabba
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