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From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
Cc: oupton@kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	will@kernel.org, joey.gouly@arm.com, seiden@linux.ibm.com,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, yuzenghui@huawei.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, steven.price@arm.com,
	vdonnefort@google.com, qperret@google.com, tabba@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 12/18] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 14:42:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8633vc6jag.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260914113338.159227-13-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>

On Mon, 14 Sep 2026 12:33:32 +0100,
Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev> wrote:
> 
> __kvm_adjust_pc() lets the host advance a vCPU's PC or inject an
> exception, which for a protected vCPU would let the host redirect
> guest execution. Drop the request there: the entry handlers apply the
> host's PC_UPDATE_REQ on re-entry, where EL2 allows it.
> 
> __kvm_adjust_pc() adjusts the vCPU a get/put pair returns, the one it
> was given outside pKVM. Both host callers hold the vCPU mutex, so a
> hyp vCPU loaded for the vCPU is loaded on the calling CPU. The request
> for a loaded protected vCPU is dropped. For a loaded non-protected
> vCPU, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY selects the copy, since adjusting the hyp
> vCPU while the host copy is authoritative loses the update at the next
> flush. Adjusting the hyp vCPU copies PC_UPDATE_REQ in and back out
> again: without the copy back, INCREMENT_PC outlives the adjustment and
> the next KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS trips WARN_ON(INCREMENT_PC) in
> kvm_pend_exception(). With no hyp vCPU loaded, as under
> KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, the host copy is adjusted as before.
> 
> Until the marshalling patch clears PC_UPDATE_REQ on the host copy at
> exit, a KVM_RUN that returns to userspace with INCREMENT_PC set leaves
> it on the host copy of a loaded protected vCPU, and a
> KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS before the next run then trips that WARN_ON.
> 
> Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c             | 21 +++++++++-----
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/adjust_pc.h | 19 +++++++++++++
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c         | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c
> index 6e60d890afa4a..7ea62e5304ae9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c
> @@ -353,12 +353,19 @@ static void kvm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   */
>  void __kvm_adjust_pc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
> -	if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, PENDING_EXCEPTION)) {
> -		kvm_inject_exception(vcpu);
> -		vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, PENDING_EXCEPTION);
> -		vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, EXCEPT_MASK);
> -	} else if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, INCREMENT_PC)) {
> -		kvm_skip_instr(vcpu);
> -		vcpu_clear_flag(vcpu, INCREMENT_PC);
> +	struct kvm_vcpu *target = pkvm_adjust_pc_get(vcpu);

nit: it is really odd to see this 'pkvm' prefix in generic code. The
point of it is not only to abstract the pvkm complexity away, but also
to have a wrapper that may be of use in other situations.

Don't respin the series just for this though, I may end-up changing
this when applying it.

> +	if (!target)
> +		return;
> +

I find this one scary, see below.

[...]

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> index da8ab636063cf..1dcc75261dc08 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> @@ -642,6 +642,38 @@ static void handle___pkvm_host_mkyoung_guest(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
>  	cpu_reg(host_ctxt, 1) =  ret;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY names the authoritative copy, the host's when set.
> + * A loaded protected vCPU takes the request at its next entry instead.
> + */
> +struct kvm_vcpu *pkvm_adjust_pc_get(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu;
> +
> +	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> +		return vcpu;
> +
> +	hyp_vcpu = pkvm_get_loaded_hyp_vcpu();
> +	if (!hyp_vcpu || hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu != vcpu)

Under which circumstances do we get hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu != vcpu?

> +		return vcpu;
> +
> +	if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
> +		return NULL;

Is it always the case that a protected vcpu cannot see its PC adjusted
at all? How is PC updated after an exit for MMIO? I feel there is an
interaction with the above, but I'm not 100% certain...

> +
> +	if (vcpu_get_flag(vcpu, PKVM_HOST_STATE_DIRTY))
> +		return vcpu;
> +
> +	vcpu_copy_flag(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu, vcpu, PC_UPDATE_REQ);
> +	return &hyp_vcpu->vcpu;
> +}
> +
> +/* Reflect the consumed request back, otherwise it stays pending. */
> +void pkvm_adjust_pc_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *target)
> +{
> +	if (target != vcpu)
> +		vcpu_copy_flag(vcpu, target, PC_UPDATE_REQ);
> +}
> +
>  static void handle___kvm_adjust_pc(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
>  {
>  	DECLARE_REG(struct kvm_vcpu *, vcpu, host_ctxt, 1);

Thanks,

	M.

-- 
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-14 13:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-14 11:33 [PATCH v3 00/18] KVM: arm64: Confine protected VM vCPU state to EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 01/18] KVM: arm64: Sync HCR_EL2.VSE back to the host vCPU under pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 02/18] KVM: arm64: Validate the host vCPU's VM before reading it " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 03/18] KVM: arm64: Pin the host vCPU before adjusting its PC " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 04/18] KVM: arm64: Disable steal time for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 05/18] KVM: arm64: Introduce per-EC entry handlers for pKVM Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 06/18] KVM: arm64: Skip fixed-feature state flush for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 07/18] KVM: arm64: Add {flush,sync}_hyp_timer_state() primitives Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 08/18] KVM: arm64: Add system register reset framework for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 09/18] KVM: arm64: Implement HVC handling for protected guests at EL2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 10/18] KVM: arm64: Handle PSCI calls for protected VMs " Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 11/18] KVM: arm64: Restrict KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT and PSCI version for protected VMs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 12/18] KVM: arm64: Prevent host PC adjustments for protected vCPUs Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 13:42   ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2026-09-14 14:43     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 13/18] KVM: arm64: Inject an UNDEF at EL2 for unhandled protected guest exits Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 14/18] KVM: arm64: Add per-EC entry/exit state marshalling for protected guests Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 15/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host access to protected VM private state Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 16/18] KVM: arm64: Reject host power-on of a vCPU that EL2 holds powered off Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 17/18] KVM: arm64: Advertise the capabilities that protected VMs support Fuad Tabba
2026-09-14 11:33 ` [PATCH v3 18/18] KVM: arm64: Document the protected VM userspace API Fuad Tabba

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