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* [PATCH] ipv4: Serialize netconf GET requests with RTNL
@ 2026-10-08  6:32 Cen Zhang
  2026-10-08  7:30 ` Ido Schimmel
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Cen Zhang @ 2026-10-08  6:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: dsahern, idosch, davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, jiri
  Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, baijiaju1990, jjzuming, zzzccc427

An in_device returned by in_dev_get() must stay alive until
inet_netconf_get_devconf() finishes reading its cnf. However, the helper
samples dev->ip_ptr under RCU and unconditionally increments refcnt,
then returns the pointer outside RCU without checking whether the count
was already zero. The net_device reference held by the request does not
retain the separately allocated in_device.

A down interface without IPv4 addresses or multicast owners can have
only the ip_ptr publication reference. Lowering its MTU below
IPV4_MIN_MTU invokes inetdev_destroy() through the RTNL-held
NETDEV_CHANGEMTU notifier. RTM_GETNETCONF runs without RTNL, allowing
the final put to follow its pointer sample but precede its increment:

  RTM_GETNETCONF                   MTU change (RTNL held)
  in_dev_get():
    rcu_read_lock()
    sample dev->ip_ptr
                                  inetdev_destroy():
                                    clear dev->ip_ptr
                                    in_dev_put(): refcnt -> 0
                                    call_rcu(in_dev_free_rcu)
    refcount_inc() from zero
    rcu_read_unlock()
                                  in_dev_free_rcu(): kfree()
  inet_netconf_fill_devconf():
    read in_dev->cnf

The zero-count increment warns and saturates the refcount, but cannot
cancel the queued free. Once the request leaves RCU, the callback can
free the attachment before the configuration read, causing a
use-after-free. Restoring a valid MTU can publish a new attachment on
the same device while the request still holds the old pointer.

Drop RTNL_FLAG_DOIT_UNLOCKED so rtnetlink holds RTNL from lookup through
reply construction and reference release. This serializes the request
with inetdev_destroy(), preventing the publication reference from being
dropped during acquisition or use. The dump handler already holds RCU
through its configuration reads and keeps RTNL_FLAG_DUMP_UNLOCKED.

KASAN report as below:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in inet_netconf_fill_devconf+0x748/0x790
    Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811d70b958 by task ip_core_fixture/498

    CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 498 Comm: ip_core_fixture Tainted: G        W           7.2.0-rc5-pmb-bt-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
    Tainted: [W]=WARN
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
     print_report+0xce/0x630
     ? inet_netconf_fill_devconf+0x748/0x790
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20d/0x410
     ? inet_netconf_fill_devconf+0x748/0x790
     kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
     ? inet_netconf_fill_devconf+0x748/0x790
     inet_netconf_fill_devconf+0x748/0x790
     ? __pfx_inet_netconf_fill_devconf+0x10/0x10
     ? inet_netconf_get_devconf+0xaef/0xe40
     inet_netconf_get_devconf+0x41c/0xe40
     ? __pfx_inet_netconf_get_devconf+0x10/0x10
     ? __pfx_inet_netconf_get_devconf+0x10/0x10
     ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x795/0xce0
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? lock_release+0xc8/0x280
     ? __pfx_inet_netconf_get_devconf+0x10/0x10
     rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7b9/0xce0
     ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __lock_acquire+0x466/0x2260
     ? lock_acquire+0x17b/0x2f0
     netlink_rcv_skb+0x133/0x390
     ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
     ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
     ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xdf/0xbd0
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x173/0xbd0
     netlink_unicast+0x504/0x840
     ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
     netlink_sendmsg+0x7f7/0xcf0
     ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x160/0x280
     ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
     ____sys_sendmsg+0x88b/0x9d0
     ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
     ___sys_sendmsg+0x125/0x1d0
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? lock_release+0xc8/0x280
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     ? netlink_bind+0x518/0x900
     ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
     __sys_sendmsg+0x13e/0x1e0
     ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
     do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
    RIP: 0033:0x7f8ea8b31687
    Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 de e8 23 ff ff ff
    RSP: 002b:00007fff83200d90 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f8ea8a9f780 RCX: 00007f8ea8b31687
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff83200e50 RDI: 0000000000000003
    RBP: 00007fff83202ed0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 00007fff83203070 R14: 00007f8ea8cdd000 R15: 0000559d62722c80
     </TASK>

    Allocated by task 496:
     kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
     kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
     __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
     __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x251/0x630
     inetdev_init+0x60/0x550
     inetdev_event+0x71e/0x1780
     notifier_call_chain+0xbb/0x330
     call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xa2/0xf0
     register_netdevice+0x17b0/0x2090
     rtnl_newlink+0x1a30/0x1f40
     rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7b9/0xce0
     netlink_rcv_skb+0x133/0x390
     netlink_unicast+0x504/0x840
     netlink_sendmsg+0x7f7/0xcf0
     ____sys_sendmsg+0x88b/0x9d0
     ___sys_sendmsg+0x125/0x1d0
     __sys_sendmsg+0x13e/0x1e0
     do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

    Freed by task 0:
     kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
     kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
     kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
     __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
     kfree+0x12b/0x530
     in_dev_free_rcu+0x51/0x90
     rcu_core+0x661/0x1d10
     handle_softirqs+0x201/0x930
     __irq_exit_rcu+0x110/0x1e0
     irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
     sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
     asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20

    Last potentially related work creation:
     kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
     kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa7/0xc0
     __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x76/0xbd0
     in_dev_finish_destroy+0x12e/0x190
     inetdev_event+0xa37/0x1780
     notifier_call_chain+0xbb/0x330
     call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xa2/0xf0
     netif_set_mtu_ext+0x47d/0x6a0
     netif_set_mtu+0x8b/0x120
     dev_set_mtu+0xb9/0x180
     dev_ifsioc+0x3b8/0x1820
     dev_ioctl+0x301/0xf80
     sock_do_ioctl+0x1dc/0x2b0
     sock_ioctl+0x41b/0x670
     __x64_sys_ioctl+0x163/0x1d0
     do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

    The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811d70b800
     which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
    The buggy address is located 344 bytes inside of
     freed 512-byte region [ffff88811d70b800, ffff88811d70ba00)

    The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
    page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11d70b
    flags: 0x200000000000000(node=0|zone=2)
    page_type: f5(slab)
    raw: 0200000000000000 ffff888100042780 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
    raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
    page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

    Memory state around the buggy address:
     ffff88811d70b800: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
     ffff88811d70b880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
    >ffff88811d70b900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                        ^
     ffff88811d70b980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
     ffff88811d70ba00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
    ==================================================================

Fixes: bbcf91053bb6 ("inet: do not use RTNL in inet_netconf_get_devconf()")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
---

diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
index 5b6b11c943e453742b4893f1c9bd9e70d3d37a6f..4e9de0c6b2c1426c4b4c8638a0a6da4be9c2034d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -2958,7 +2958,7 @@ static const struct rtnl_msg_handler devinet_rtnl_msg_handlers[] __initconst = {
 	 .flags = RTNL_FLAG_DUMP_UNLOCKED | RTNL_FLAG_DUMP_SPLIT_NLM_DONE},
 	{.protocol = PF_INET, .msgtype = RTM_GETNETCONF,
 	 .doit = inet_netconf_get_devconf, .dumpit = inet_netconf_dump_devconf,
-	 .flags = RTNL_FLAG_DOIT_UNLOCKED | RTNL_FLAG_DUMP_UNLOCKED},
+	 .flags = RTNL_FLAG_DUMP_UNLOCKED},
 	{.owner = THIS_MODULE, .protocol = PF_INET, .msgtype = RTM_GETMULTICAST,
 	 .dumpit = inet_dump_ifmcaddr, .flags = RTNL_FLAG_DUMP_UNLOCKED},
 };

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-10-08  8:33 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2026-10-08  6:32 [PATCH] ipv4: Serialize netconf GET requests with RTNL Cen Zhang
2026-10-08  7:30 ` Ido Schimmel
2026-10-08  8:33   ` Cen Zhang

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