From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Edgecombe, Rick P <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 01/24] kernel/fork: Break out vmap task allocation into helper
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 12:51:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261021195121.B9894E1D@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261021195120.E61EC737@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com>
Prepare for kernel shadow stacks. Move the low-level vmalloc call
into its own helper. This will soon have to deal with more things
like appending the shadow stack allocation and setting up the
different permissions for shadow stack pages.
---
b/kernel/fork.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff -puN kernel/fork.c~alloc_thread_stack_node-perms kernel/fork.c
--- a/kernel/fork.c~alloc_thread_stack_node-perms 2026-10-21 12:36:32.589870843 -0700
+++ b/kernel/fork.c 2026-10-21 12:36:32.592870848 -0700
@@ -330,6 +330,13 @@ err:
return ret;
}
+static void *__vmalloc_thread_stack_node(int node)
+{
+ return __vmalloc_node(THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_ALIGN,
+ GFP_VMAP_STACK,
+ node, __builtin_return_address(0));
+}
+
static int alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
{
struct vm_struct *vm_area;
@@ -356,9 +363,7 @@ static int alloc_thread_stack_node(struc
return 0;
}
- stack = __vmalloc_node(THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_ALIGN,
- GFP_VMAP_STACK,
- node, __builtin_return_address(0));
+ stack = __vmalloc_thread_stack_node(node);
if (!stack)
return -ENOMEM;
_
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-21 19:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-21 19:51 [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86 Kernel Shadow Stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 02/24] kernel/fork: Use sizeof() union instead of TASK_SIZE Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/24] kernel/sched: Move thread stack to its own structure Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 04/24] kernel/fork: Allow arch-specific stack initialization Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/24] kernel/task: Add shadow stack to thread structure Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/24] kernel/task: Add "runtime" check for shadow stack support Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/24] kernel/fork: Clear shadow stacks alongside normal stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/24] x86/cpu: Add basic x86 kernel shadow stack infrastructure Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/24] x86/cea: Refactor "CEA" macros to deal with multiple stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/24] x86/cea: Refactor stack mapping macros Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/24] x86/mm: Add kernel shadow stack permission macros Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/24] x86/cea: Map and use FRED exception shadow stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 21:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-10-21 22:59 ` Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/24] x86/task: Grow thread_union for " Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/24] x86/mm: Establish shadow stack permissions in thread mapping Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/24] x86/task: Hook up arch hook to detect shadow stack enabling Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/24] x86/mm: Kill shadow stack page permission warning Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/24] x86/task: Context switch the kernel shadow stack register value Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 18/24] kernel/task: Add a helper to get the thread_union Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 19/24] x86/process: Initialize cloned task shadow stack Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 20/24] x86/entry: Stash kernel SSP on FRED entry Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 21/24] x86/extable: Update shadow stack entry frame during RIP overwrites Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 22/24] kernel/task: Add a helper to locate the top of the shadow stack Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 23/24] x86/entry: Populate FRED register for user=>kernel transitions Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 24/24] [DO NOT MERGE] x86/shstk: Depend out everything incompatible with kernel shadow stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 21:36 ` [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86 Kernel Shadow Stacks Peter Zijlstra
2026-10-21 21:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261021195121.B9894E1D@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com \
--to=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
--cc=tglx@kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®