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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Edgecombe, Rick P <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 04/24] kernel/fork: Allow arch-specific stack initialization
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 12:51:26 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261021195126.CE2581EB@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261021195120.E61EC737@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com>


Right now, the entire thread_union has uniform permissions. Shadow
stacks obviously do not have the same page permissions as the rest
of the stacks. Add a new arch-specific hook so shadow stack page
permissions can be established.

Note: this is slow. It requires TLB invalidation in the arch code,
which is abhorrently stupid. It will be fixed up in due time.

---

 b/include/linux/thread_info.h |    5 +++++
 b/kernel/fork.c               |   14 +++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff -puN include/linux/thread_info.h~generic-arch_init_thread_stacks include/linux/thread_info.h
--- a/include/linux/thread_info.h~generic-arch_init_thread_stacks	2026-10-21 12:36:34.114873761 -0700
+++ b/include/linux/thread_info.h	2026-10-21 12:36:34.177873882 -0700
@@ -228,6 +228,11 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_fram
 static inline void arch_setup_new_exec(void) { }
 #endif
 
+struct thread_stacks;
+#ifndef arch_init_thread_stacks
+static inline void arch_init_thread_stacks(struct thread_stacks *ts) { }
+#endif
+
 void arch_task_cache_init(void); /* for CONFIG_SH */
 void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk);
 int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst,
diff -puN kernel/fork.c~generic-arch_init_thread_stacks kernel/fork.c
--- a/kernel/fork.c~generic-arch_init_thread_stacks	2026-10-21 12:36:34.175873878 -0700
+++ b/kernel/fork.c	2026-10-21 12:36:34.178873884 -0700
@@ -332,9 +332,17 @@ err:
 
 static void *__vmalloc_thread_stack_node(int node)
 {
-	return __vmalloc_node(sizeof(union thread_union), THREAD_ALIGN,
-			      GFP_VMAP_STACK,
-			      node, __builtin_return_address(0));
+	union thread_union *tu;
+
+	tu = __vmalloc_node(sizeof(union thread_union), THREAD_ALIGN,
+			    GFP_VMAP_STACK,
+			    node, __builtin_return_address(0));
+	if (!tu)
+		return NULL;
+
+	arch_init_thread_stacks(&tu->stacks);
+
+	return tu;
 }
 
 static int alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
_

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-21 19:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-21 19:51 [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86 Kernel Shadow Stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/24] kernel/fork: Break out vmap task allocation into helper Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 02/24] kernel/fork: Use sizeof() union instead of TASK_SIZE Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/24] kernel/sched: Move thread stack to its own structure Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/24] kernel/task: Add shadow stack to thread structure Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/24] kernel/task: Add "runtime" check for shadow stack support Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/24] kernel/fork: Clear shadow stacks alongside normal stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/24] x86/cpu: Add basic x86 kernel shadow stack infrastructure Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/24] x86/cea: Refactor "CEA" macros to deal with multiple stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/24] x86/cea: Refactor stack mapping macros Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/24] x86/mm: Add kernel shadow stack permission macros Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/24] x86/cea: Map and use FRED exception shadow stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 21:40   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-10-21 22:59     ` Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/24] x86/task: Grow thread_union for " Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/24] x86/mm: Establish shadow stack permissions in thread mapping Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/24] x86/task: Hook up arch hook to detect shadow stack enabling Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/24] x86/mm: Kill shadow stack page permission warning Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/24] x86/task: Context switch the kernel shadow stack register value Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 18/24] kernel/task: Add a helper to get the thread_union Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 19/24] x86/process: Initialize cloned task shadow stack Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 20/24] x86/entry: Stash kernel SSP on FRED entry Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 21/24] x86/extable: Update shadow stack entry frame during RIP overwrites Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 22/24] kernel/task: Add a helper to locate the top of the shadow stack Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 23/24] x86/entry: Populate FRED register for user=>kernel transitions Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 24/24] [DO NOT MERGE] x86/shstk: Depend out everything incompatible with kernel shadow stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 21:36 ` [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86 Kernel Shadow Stacks Peter Zijlstra
2026-10-21 21:53 ` Peter Zijlstra

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