From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Edgecombe, Rick P <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 20/24] x86/entry: Stash kernel SSP on FRED entry
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 12:51:47 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261021195147.3B42C03D@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261021195120.E61EC737@davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com>
Kernel shadow stacks are intended to preserve control flow integrity
across all kinds of RIP transitions, not just strict CALLs. One of
those transitions is when there is a kernel interrupt or exception
and the kernel stops what it was doing and jumps over to
asm_fred_entrypoint_kernel.
On those jumps, FRED hardware writes a special frame to the shadow
stack. That frame includes the return address of the interrupted
kernel code. When returning from the event via ERETS, the hardware
compares this shadow stack frame with the return address on the
regular stack to ensure that they match.
The kernel munges event return addresses for lots of reasons. But,
with shadow stacks, it also needs to munge the corresponding
shadow stack frame contents.
Make it easy for RIP-munging code to locate the shadow stack frame.
Stash off the shadow stack pointer so it sits adjacent to pt_regs.
Without this, anything wishing to locate the special shadow stack
frame would need to walk up the stack. I'm not opposed to doing
it that way, this just seemed simpler for now.
Note, since RDSSPQ is a NOP with shadow stacks off, this assembly
is safe either way, although it does a unnecessary push/pop.
---
b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff -puN arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S~fred-entry-ssp-stash arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S~fred-entry-ssp-stash 2026-10-21 12:36:42.552889917 -0700
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_fred.S 2026-10-21 12:36:42.555889923 -0700
@@ -16,6 +16,26 @@
.code64
.section .noinstr.text, "ax"
+/*
+ * Kernel-mode events: save the SSP of the shadow stack frame FRED
+ * pushed (old SSP, LIP, CS) just below pt_regs. See struct
+ * fred_kernel_frame.
+ */
+.macro PUSH_KERNEL_EVENT_SSP
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+ xorl %eax, %eax
+ rdsspq %rax /* nop if shadow stacks are off */
+ pushq %rax
+ UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=8
+#endif
+.endm
+
+.macro POP_KERNEL_EVENT_SSP
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+ addq $8, %rsp
+#endif
+.endm
+
.macro FRED_ENTER
UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
@@ -54,7 +74,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(asm_fred_entrypoint_user)
.org asm_fred_entrypoint_user + 256, 0xcc
SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(asm_fred_entrypoint_kernel)
FRED_ENTER
+ PUSH_KERNEL_EVENT_SSP
call fred_entry_from_kernel
+ POP_KERNEL_EVENT_SSP
FRED_EXIT
ERETS
SYM_CODE_END(asm_fred_entrypoint_kernel)
_
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-21 19:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-21 19:51 [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86 Kernel Shadow Stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/24] kernel/fork: Break out vmap task allocation into helper Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 02/24] kernel/fork: Use sizeof() union instead of TASK_SIZE Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/24] kernel/sched: Move thread stack to its own structure Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 04/24] kernel/fork: Allow arch-specific stack initialization Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/24] kernel/task: Add shadow stack to thread structure Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/24] kernel/task: Add "runtime" check for shadow stack support Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/24] kernel/fork: Clear shadow stacks alongside normal stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/24] x86/cpu: Add basic x86 kernel shadow stack infrastructure Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/24] x86/cea: Refactor "CEA" macros to deal with multiple stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/24] x86/cea: Refactor stack mapping macros Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/24] x86/mm: Add kernel shadow stack permission macros Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/24] x86/cea: Map and use FRED exception shadow stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 21:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-10-21 22:59 ` Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/24] x86/task: Grow thread_union for " Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/24] x86/mm: Establish shadow stack permissions in thread mapping Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/24] x86/task: Hook up arch hook to detect shadow stack enabling Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/24] x86/mm: Kill shadow stack page permission warning Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/24] x86/task: Context switch the kernel shadow stack register value Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 18/24] kernel/task: Add a helper to get the thread_union Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 19/24] x86/process: Initialize cloned task shadow stack Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2026-10-22 22:14 ` [RFC][PATCH 20/24] x86/entry: Stash kernel SSP on FRED entry Andrew Cooper
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 21/24] x86/extable: Update shadow stack entry frame during RIP overwrites Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 22/24] kernel/task: Add a helper to locate the top of the shadow stack Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 23/24] x86/entry: Populate FRED register for user=>kernel transitions Dave Hansen
2026-10-21 19:51 ` [RFC][PATCH 24/24] [DO NOT MERGE] x86/shstk: Depend out everything incompatible with kernel shadow stacks Dave Hansen
2026-10-22 21:35 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-10-22 21:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-10-21 21:36 ` [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86 Kernel Shadow Stacks Peter Zijlstra
2026-10-21 21:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-10-23 2:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-10-23 2:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
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