* [PATCH] lib/crypto: aes: use memzero_explicit() instead of memset()
@ 2026-10-28 14:26 Mohamad Raizudeen
2026-10-28 15:51 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Mohamad Raizudeen @ 2026-10-28 14:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ebiggers; +Cc: ardb, Jason, linux-crypto, linux-kernel, Mohamad Raizudeen
aes_gcm_decrypt() and aes_ccm_decrypt() use plain memset() to wipe the
output buffer when authentication fails. But the compiler can optimize
that wipe away, so use memzero_explicit() instead of memset().
This matches every other sensitive wipes in this file, which already
uses memzero_explicit() for keystream blocks, tmp buffers, ctx
teardowns.
Signed-off-by: Mohamad Raizudeen <raizudeen.kerneldev@gmail.com>
---
lib/crypto/aes.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/crypto/aes.c b/lib/crypto/aes.c
index e1c191551736..7814ef525239 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/aes.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/aes.c
@@ -1733,7 +1733,7 @@ int aes_gcm_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, const u8 *authtag,
* Clear the inauthentic decrypted data so that callers won't
* receive it even if they fail to correctly handle errors.
*/
- memset(dst, 0, data_len);
+ memzero_explicit(dst, data_len);
}
return err;
}
@@ -2074,7 +2074,7 @@ int aes_ccm_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, const u8 *authtag,
* Clear the inauthentic decrypted data so that callers won't
* receive it even if they fail to correctly handle errors.
*/
- memset(dst, 0, data_len);
+ memzero_explicit(dst, data_len);
}
return err;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] lib/crypto: aes: use memzero_explicit() instead of memset()
2026-10-28 14:26 [PATCH] lib/crypto: aes: use memzero_explicit() instead of memset() Mohamad Raizudeen
@ 2026-10-28 15:51 ` Eric Biggers
2026-10-28 20:56 ` David Laight
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2026-10-28 15:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mohamad Raizudeen; +Cc: ardb, Jason, linux-crypto, linux-kernel
On Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 07:56:36PM +0530, Mohamad Raizudeen wrote:
> aes_gcm_decrypt() and aes_ccm_decrypt() use plain memset() to wipe the
> output buffer when authentication fails. But the compiler can optimize
> that wipe away, so use memzero_explicit() instead of memset().
>
> This matches every other sensitive wipes in this file, which already
> uses memzero_explicit() for keystream blocks, tmp buffers, ctx
> teardowns.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mohamad Raizudeen <raizudeen.kerneldev@gmail.com>
> ---
> lib/crypto/aes.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/crypto/aes.c b/lib/crypto/aes.c
> index e1c191551736..7814ef525239 100644
> --- a/lib/crypto/aes.c
> +++ b/lib/crypto/aes.c
> @@ -1733,7 +1733,7 @@ int aes_gcm_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, const u8 *authtag,
> * Clear the inauthentic decrypted data so that callers won't
> * receive it even if they fail to correctly handle errors.
> */
> - memset(dst, 0, data_len);
> + memzero_explicit(dst, data_len);
This isn't for "zeroization" (making the data unavailable in ramdumps),
though. It's just so the caller doesn't accidentally use the
inauthentic data, as the comment right above it states.
- Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] lib/crypto: aes: use memzero_explicit() instead of memset()
2026-10-28 15:51 ` Eric Biggers
@ 2026-10-28 20:56 ` David Laight
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: David Laight @ 2026-10-28 20:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers; +Cc: Mohamad Raizudeen, ardb, Jason, linux-crypto, linux-kernel
On Wed, 28 Oct 2026 15:51:34 +0000
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 07:56:36PM +0530, Mohamad Raizudeen wrote:
> > aes_gcm_decrypt() and aes_ccm_decrypt() use plain memset() to wipe the
> > output buffer when authentication fails. But the compiler can optimize
> > that wipe away, so use memzero_explicit() instead of memset().
> >
> > This matches every other sensitive wipes in this file, which already
> > uses memzero_explicit() for keystream blocks, tmp buffers, ctx
> > teardowns.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mohamad Raizudeen <raizudeen.kerneldev@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > lib/crypto/aes.c | 4 ++--
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/lib/crypto/aes.c b/lib/crypto/aes.c
> > index e1c191551736..7814ef525239 100644
> > --- a/lib/crypto/aes.c
> > +++ b/lib/crypto/aes.c
> > @@ -1733,7 +1733,7 @@ int aes_gcm_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, const u8 *authtag,
> > * Clear the inauthentic decrypted data so that callers won't
> > * receive it even if they fail to correctly handle errors.
> > */
> > - memset(dst, 0, data_len);
> > + memzero_explicit(dst, data_len);
>
> This isn't for "zeroization" (making the data unavailable in ramdumps),
> though. It's just so the caller doesn't accidentally use the
> inauthentic data, as the comment right above it states.
It is also a parameter so has to be zeroed anyway.
memzero_explicit() is used to clear on-stack buffers.
David
>
> - Eric
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2026-10-28 14:26 [PATCH] lib/crypto: aes: use memzero_explicit() instead of memset() Mohamad Raizudeen
2026-10-28 15:51 ` Eric Biggers
2026-10-28 20:56 ` David Laight
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