From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Kevin Brodsky" <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb+git@google.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>, "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Linu Cherian" <linu.cherian@arm.com>,
"Linus Walleij" <linusw@kernel.org>,
"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
"Maxwell Bland" <mbland@motorola.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Pierre Langlois" <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
"Pierre-Clément Tosi" <ptosi@google.com>,
"Quentin Perret" <qperret@google.com>,
"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
"Ryan Roberts" <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
"Yang Shi" <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
"Yeoreum Yun" <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
x86@kernel.org, "Ira Weiny" <iweiny@kernel.org>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v10 11/22] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature
Date: Mon, 09 Nov 2026 15:58:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261109-kpkeys-v10-11-aa6c4d9603bc@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261109-kpkeys-v10-0-aa6c4d9603bc@arm.com>
kpkeys_hardened_pgtables is a hardening feature based on kpkeys. It
aims to prevent the corruption of page tables by: 1. mapping all
page table pages, both kernel and user, with a privileged pkey
(KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES), and 2. granting write access to that pkey
only when running at in a privileged kpkeys context
(KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES). This patch introduces basic infrastructure;
the implementation of both aspects follows.
The feature is exposed as CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES; it
requires explicit architecture opt-in by selecting
ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES, since much of the page table
handling is arch-specific. It also depends on
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP to modify the direct mapping of page tables
using set_direct_map_pkey().
Supported architectures must also provide
arch_supports_kpkeys_early() in <asm/kpkeys.h>. This will be used
during early boot to detect whether kpkeys_hardened_pgtables is
going to be enabled (e.g. to decide how to allocate early page
tables).
Because this feature relies on kpkeys being supported and modifies
attributes of the linear map, it must be inactive during early boot.
mm_core_init() enables it before any call to pagetable_alloc() is
made.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
---
include/linux/kpkeys.h | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/kpkeys_types.h | 5 +++++
mm/Kconfig | 3 +++
mm/Makefile | 1 +
mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
mm/mm_init.c | 2 ++
security/Kconfig.hardening | 12 ++++++++++++
7 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys.h b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
index 69ec4808d850..cd3281223778 100644
--- a/include/linux/kpkeys.h
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/kpkeys_types.h>
/**
@@ -104,4 +105,36 @@ static inline bool kpkeys_supported(void)
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled(void)
+{
+ return static_branch_unlikely(&kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+}
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled(void)
+{
+ return arch_supports_kpkeys_early();
+}
+
+void kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_enabled(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_early_enabled(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline void kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void) {}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES */
+
#endif /* _LINUX_KPKEYS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h b/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h
index 9de59092e9c3..09f15a9565cf 100644
--- a/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/kpkeys_types.h
@@ -8,10 +8,15 @@
#include <asm/kpkeys_types.h>
#endif
+#ifndef KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES
+#define KPKEYS_PKEY_PGTABLES 1
+#endif
+
#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
enum kpkeys_ctx {
KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT = 0,
+ KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES,
KPKEYS_CTX_COUNT,
};
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 4635628de622..cf3b6105c4ad 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -1267,6 +1267,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
bool
config ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS
bool
+config ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+ bool
+ depends on ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS && ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP
config ARCH_USES_PG_ARCH_2
bool
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index 2a3ec53d62ee..07b67eaa1b3b 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -149,3 +149,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EXECMEM) += execmem.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TMPFS_QUOTA) += shmem_quota.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LAZY_MMU_MODE_KUNIT_TEST) += tests/lazy_mmu_mode_kunit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING) += alloc_tag.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES) += kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.o
diff --git a/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4c654e0cf585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <kunit/visibility.h>
+
+__ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+
+void __init kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init(void)
+{
+ if (!kpkeys_supported())
+ return;
+
+ static_branch_enable(&kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_key);
+}
diff --git a/mm/mm_init.c b/mm/mm_init.c
index d99af80ec752..347246135ce1 100644
--- a/mm/mm_init.c
+++ b/mm/mm_init.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/buffer_head.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
#include <linux/kfence.h>
+#include <linux/kpkeys.h>
#include <linux/page_ext.h>
#include <linux/pti.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
@@ -2733,6 +2734,7 @@ void __init mm_core_init(void)
kmemleak_init();
ptlock_cache_init();
pgtable_cache_init();
+ kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_init();
debug_objects_mem_init();
vmalloc_init();
/* If no deferred init page_ext now, as vmap is fully initialized */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 81c81ad983ad..9a6f50103482 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -271,6 +271,18 @@ config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
If unsure, say N.
+config KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+ bool "Harden page tables using kernel pkeys"
+ depends on ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS_HARDENED_PGTABLES
+ help
+ This option makes all page tables mostly read-only by
+ allocating them with a non-default protection key (pkey) and
+ only enabling write access to that pkey in routines that are
+ expected to write to page table entries.
+
+ This option has no effect if the system does not support
+ kernel pkeys.
+
endmenu
config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
--
2.56.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-09 16:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-09 15:58 [PATCH RFC v10 00/22] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 01/22] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 02/22] set_memory: Introduce set_direct_map_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 03/22] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 04/22] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 05/22] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_direct_map_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 06/22] arm64: Disable EL2 trapping of POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 07/22] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 08/22] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 09/22] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 10/22] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 12/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 13/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect early kernel " Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 14/22] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap " Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 15/22] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 16/22] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 17/22] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 18/22] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 19/22] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 20/22] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 21/22] arm64: mm: Map kernel image alias of init_pg_dir read-only Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 15:58 ` [PATCH RFC v10 22/22] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2026-11-09 19:28 ` Mark Brown
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