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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>,
	Hungyu Lin <dennylin0707@gmail.com>,
	 James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	 Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:26:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116.afieche0Te7E@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261110202436.2408244-7-mic@digikod.net>

Thanks, applied!

I fixed some minor issues though, see
https://git.kernel.org/mic/c/57493c3b7f449a60d1c43322158671b98684f9b1

On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 09:24:34PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Some documented claims about LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE do not
> hold for every capability check.  Remove them instead of listing their
> exceptions, and call it a permission instead of a hook.
> 
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
>  Documentation/security/landlock.rst      | 8 ++++----
>  Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 8 ++++----
>  include/uapi/linux/landlock.h            | 6 +++---
>  3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> index d81f1c2cd236..98c2e7139e8d 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
> @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
>  ==================================
>  
>  :Author: Mickaël Salaün
> -:Date: October 2026
> +:Date: November 2026
>  
>  Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing).  To
>  harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
> @@ -359,9 +359,9 @@ framework in ``log.c``, compiled under ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG``
>  (automatically selected by ``CONFIG_AUDIT`` or ``CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS``).
>  
>  Audit records respect audit configuration, the domain's Landlock log
> -flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``.  Tracepoints fire unconditionally,
> -independent of these settings.  The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
> -always incremented regardless of logging configuration.
> +flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``.  Tracepoints fire independently of
> +these settings.  The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
> +incremented regardless of logging configuration.
>  
>  Each denial tracepoint carries a ``logged`` field reporting the
>  audit-logging verdict: whether the denial would be written to the audit
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> index 3d45b956b640..d00e94d8ed37 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
>  =====================================
>  
>  :Author: Mickaël Salaün
> -:Date: October 2026
> +:Date: November 2026
>  
>  The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global
>  filesystem or network access) for a set of processes.  Because Landlock
> @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ acquisition via :manpage:`open_tree(2)` / :manpage:`fsmount(2)`.  Namespaces
>  the process is already a member of when the domain is enforced are implicitly
>  allowed (the process could not continue running otherwise); rules describe
>  which new namespace types the process may acquire.
> -``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates every exercise of a capability
> +``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates the exercise of capabilities
>  after the domain is enforced, regardless
>  of how the capability was obtained (inherited credentials, ``CLONE_NEWUSER``
>  grant, ``setuid``/file-cap-bearing :manpage:`execve(2)`, etc.).  Configuring
> @@ -641,9 +641,9 @@ after a domain is enforced through user namespace entry or :manpage:`capset(2)`;
>  privileged sandboxes that did not set ``PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` may also gain
>  capabilities through :manpage:`execve(2)` of binaries with file capabilities.
>  In all cases, :manpage:`capget(2)` will report the credential's capability sets,
> -but any denied capability will fail with ``EPERM`` when exercised.  Do not rely
> +but any denied capability will fail when exercised.  Do not rely
>  on :manpage:`capget(2)` to determine whether the policy permits a given
> -capability; only the actual operation will return ``EPERM`` upon denial.
> +capability.
>  
>  Truncating files
>  ----------------
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> index 24510e5d8479..c9e4ce23778b 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> @@ -622,9 +622,9 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr {
>   * - %LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE: Restrict the use of specific Linux
>   *   capabilities.  A process in a Landlock domain that handles this permission
>   *   is denied from exercising capabilities that are not explicitly allowed by a
> - *   %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule.  This hook is purely restrictive: it can
> - *   deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can never
> - *   grant capabilities that the kernel already denied.  Support added in
> + *   %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule.  This permission is purely restrictive: it
> + *   can deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can
> + *   never grant capabilities that the kernel already denied.  Support added in
>   *   Landlock ABI version 12.
>   */
>  #define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE			(1ULL << 0)
> -- 
> 2.56.0
> 
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16 13:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-10 20:24 [PATCH 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 4/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 5/6] selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 20:24 ` [PATCH 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-16 13:26   ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-11-11 18:28 ` [PATCH 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks Serge Hallyn (AMD)

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