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From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: "Mario Limonciello (AMD)" <superm1@kernel.org>
Cc: "Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>,
	Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:44:30 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116194430.GD2452510@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261102-lockdown-iommu-v1-0-00f3c2be4c9f@kernel.org>

On Mon, Nov 02, 2026 at 08:00:24AM -0600, Mario Limonciello (AMD) wrote:
> Lockdown is a kernel LSM that restricts access to sensitive kernel
> resources (e.g. /dev/mem, kernel modules, perf, tracing, kprobes,
> BPF access to kernel memory). However, without IOMMU, any PCI/PCIe
> device can perform DMA to arbitrary physical memory, effectively
> bypassing all lockdown protections.

I don't see how this is enough?

You can have an iommu but the commandline can put the whole thing in
DMA passthrough, which is the same functionality as not having an
iommu.

It is not like "any" PCI device can do this DMA. Lockdown
systematically prevents any userspace from triggering such an
uncontrolled DMA.

This is more about preventing someone with physical control of the HW
from access all of memory, which IMHO, is not part of the threat model
lockdown should have.

If external attacks through PCIe are part of your threat model then
lockdown is the wrong direction. Leon's driver trust series is how we
are trying to solve this issue comprehensively in a useful way.

Jason

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16 19:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-02 14:00 Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] iommu: Add iommu_is_available() API Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] security: lockdown: Prevent boot with lockdown but no IOMMU Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-11  7:30 ` [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Xiu Jianfeng
2026-11-12 19:27   ` Mario Limonciello
2026-11-16 13:28     ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2026-11-16 19:49     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2026-11-16 19:46   ` Mario Limonciello

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