From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: Mario Limonciello <superm1@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>,
"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 15:49:06 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116194906.GE2452510@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a444421f-178b-49be-98b7-d34dfb147604@kernel.org>
On Thu, Nov 12, 2026 at 01:27:50PM -0600, Mario Limonciello wrote:
> The problem I see is that in today's day it's incredibly easy to hotplug an
> external PCIe device and not "realize" that it's malicious. For example if
> I leave a dock on my desk and someone inserts malware into it
> I might think it's perfectly fine.
That has nothing to do with lockdown.
We already have indication if a PCIe channel is external and
pluggable. If you want to demand that such channels have non-identity
translation that seems like a reasonable thing, but nothing like this
is handled by LSM today. Nor do I know how you could opt into such a
mode without causing regressions..
> The current mitigation that exists is that in the Linux ecosystem we don't
> turn on PCIe tunneling "automatically" unless the IOMMU is active.
>
> Nominally this happens by way of 'bolt' userspace writing a sysfs file after
> it confirmed IOMMU was enabled both pre-boot and by the kernel.
Yes, and we are working to generalize this kind of flow to all of PCI
not just thunderbolt.
> How would you feel about at least blocking the user from turning off IOMMU
> (if it's present on the system) via the kernel command line while lockdown
> was enabled?
If you wanted a mode that forced protective iommu translations for
everything always that could be reasonable, but I don't see how it can
have anything to do with lockdown without creating regressions.
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 19:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-02 14:00 Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] iommu: Add iommu_is_available() API Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] security: lockdown: Prevent boot with lockdown but no IOMMU Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-11 7:30 ` [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Xiu Jianfeng
2026-11-12 19:27 ` Mario Limonciello
2026-11-16 13:28 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2026-11-16 19:49 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2026-11-16 19:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:46 ` Mario Limonciello
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