From: Mario Limonciello <superm1@kernel.org>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: "Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>,
Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:46:40 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <818e80bc-4b7c-404a-9c64-b103935eea15@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116194430.GD2452510@ziepe.ca>
On 11/16/26 13:44, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 02, 2026 at 08:00:24AM -0600, Mario Limonciello (AMD) wrote:
>> Lockdown is a kernel LSM that restricts access to sensitive kernel
>> resources (e.g. /dev/mem, kernel modules, perf, tracing, kprobes,
>> BPF access to kernel memory). However, without IOMMU, any PCI/PCIe
>> device can perform DMA to arbitrary physical memory, effectively
>> bypassing all lockdown protections.
>
> I don't see how this is enough?
>
> You can have an iommu but the commandline can put the whole thing in
> DMA passthrough, which is the same functionality as not having an
> iommu.
Well that's why I was suggesting that we explicitly blocked manipulating
IOMMU from the command line when lockdown is enabled.
>
> It is not like "any" PCI device can do this DMA. Lockdown
> systematically prevents any userspace from triggering such an
> uncontrolled DMA.
>
> This is more about preventing someone with physical control of the HW
> from access all of memory, which IMHO, is not part of the threat model
> lockdown should have.
>
> If external attacks through PCIe are part of your threat model then
> lockdown is the wrong direction. Leon's driver trust series is how we
> are trying to solve this issue comprehensively in a useful way.
>
> Jason
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 19:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-02 14:00 Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] iommu: Add iommu_is_available() API Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] security: lockdown: Prevent boot with lockdown but no IOMMU Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-11 7:30 ` [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Xiu Jianfeng
2026-11-12 19:27 ` Mario Limonciello
2026-11-16 13:28 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2026-11-16 19:49 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:46 ` Mario Limonciello [this message]
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