From: "Manwaring, Derek" <derekmn@amazon.com>
To: <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
<jpoimboe@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>, <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 21/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2024 17:50:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2957b59e-25f4-4510-9053-8ad5067a60e5@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240912190857.235849-22-david.kaplan@amd.com>
On 2024-09-12 14:08-0500 David Kaplan wrote:
> @@ -446,7 +450,8 @@ static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void)
> if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
> if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
> - (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
> + (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt() ||
> + cpu_mitigate_attack_vector(CPU_MITIGATE_CROSS_THREAD)))
> cpu_smt_disable(false);
> }
> }
Maybe I'm missing something here - if you care about user/user, why
would you not care about cross-thread? It seems to me SMT should be
turned off for all of the vectors.
Derek
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-01 0:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-12 19:08 [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/34] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-10-24 13:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/34] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/34] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/34] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/34] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:40 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/34] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/34] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:32 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/34] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 12:41 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:25 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 14/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 15/34] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 15:21 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 17/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 18/34] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:43 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:53 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:21 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 19/34] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 20/34] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 21/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:50 ` Manwaring, Derek [this message]
2024-10-01 1:58 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:37 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 20:11 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 20:26 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 15:50 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-10-02 19:40 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 22/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 23/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 24/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 25/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 26/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:37 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 19:57 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 20:16 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 21:15 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 0:39 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:46 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:18 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-13 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 28/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 29/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 30/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 31/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 32/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 33/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 34/34] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2024-09-17 17:04 ` [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2024-09-18 6:29 ` Kaplan, David
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