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From: "Manwaring, Derek" <derekmn@amazon.com>
To: <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	<derekmn@amazon.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
	<pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>, <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH 18/34] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2024 15:21:42 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7d2e1c7f-d778-4a5a-b566-6f99a1d78838@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <LV3PR12MB92651C6977B4F6F701416ED294772@LV3PR12MB9265.namprd12.prod.outlook.com>

On 2024-10-01 01:53+0000 David Kaplan wrote:
> On 2024-09-30 17:43-0700 Derek Manwaring wrote:
> > I think it'd be useful to get to a point that if someone comes across one of the
> > many papers & issue names, they could find it here and have an idea of how
> > it impacts their workload. Maybe this isn't the place for that kind of a
> > glossary, but interested in hearing where you see something like that fitting
> > in. If we could at least add a column or footnote for each to capture
> > something like "SRSO is also known as Inception and CVE-2023-20569," I
> > think that would go a long way to reduce confusion.
>
> That's a good idea.  One thought could be a new documentation file which could
> map CVE numbers to vendor/researcher names, kernel options, and related
> documentation.  Some of the issues already have their own documentation files
> with more details, but not all do.  I tend to agree it would be nice to have
> something easily searchable to help navigate all the names/acronyms.
>
> Open to other ideas on how to present the info, but this seems like a good
> thing to add somewhere.

Great, yeah if not as an addition to "Summary of attack-vector mitigations,"
maybe a new table in hw-vuln/index would be a good place.

Derek

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-01 22:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-12 19:08 [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack " David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/34] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-10-24 13:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/34] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/34] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/34] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/34] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-10-08  8:40   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/34] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/34] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08  8:32   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:28     ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/34] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 12:41   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:25     ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 14/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 15/34] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 15:21   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 17/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 18/34] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-10-01  0:43   ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01  1:53     ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:21       ` Manwaring, Derek [this message]
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 19/34] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 20/34] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 21/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-10-01  0:50   ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01  1:58     ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:37       ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 14:28         ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 20:11           ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 20:26             ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 15:50         ` Pawan Gupta
2024-10-02 19:40           ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 22/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 23/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 24/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 25/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 26/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:37   ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 19:57     ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 20:16       ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 21:15         ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01  0:39           ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01  1:46             ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:18               ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-13 14:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 28/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 29/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 30/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 31/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 32/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 33/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 34/34] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2024-09-17 17:04 ` [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2024-09-18  6:29   ` Kaplan, David

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