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From: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 11/34] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 11:32:54 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bb0ad741-6474-4668-a895-2554cdcb8b33@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240912190857.235849-12-david.kaplan@amd.com>



On 12.09.24 г. 22:08 ч., David Kaplan wrote:
> Restructure retbleed mitigation to use select/update/apply functions to
> create consistent vulnerability handling.  The retbleed_update_mitigation()
> simplifies the dependency between spectre_v2 and retbleed.
> 
> The command line options now directly select a preferred mitigation
> which simplifies the logic.
> 
> Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++---------------------
>   1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-)
> 

<snip>

>   static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
>   {
> -	bool mitigate_smt = false;
> -
>   	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
>   		return;
>   
> -	switch (retbleed_cmd) {
> -	case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF:
> -		return;
> -
> -	case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET:
> -		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
> -			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
> -		} else {
> +	switch (retbleed_mitigation) {
> +	case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET:
> +		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
> +			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_AUTO;
>   			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY.\n");
> -			goto do_cmd_auto;
>   		}
>   		break;
> -
> -	case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB:
> -		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
> -			pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n");
> -			goto do_cmd_auto;
> -		} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
> -			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
> -		} else {
> -			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
> -			goto do_cmd_auto;
> +	case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
> +		if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {

This check is redundant, if this leg of the switch is executed it's 
because retbleed_mitigation is already RETBLEED_MITIGATIOB_IBPB.

> +			if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
> +				pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n");
> +				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_AUTO;
> +			} else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
> +				pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
> +				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_AUTO;
> +			}
>   		}
>   		break;
> -

<snip>

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-08  8:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-12 19:08 [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/34] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-10-24 13:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/34] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/34] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/34] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/34] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-10-08  8:40   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/34] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/34] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08  8:32   ` Nikolay Borisov [this message]
2024-10-08 14:28     ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/34] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 12:41   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:25     ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 14/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 15/34] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 15:21   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 17/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 18/34] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-10-01  0:43   ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01  1:53     ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:21       ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 19/34] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 20/34] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 21/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-10-01  0:50   ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01  1:58     ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:37       ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 14:28         ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 20:11           ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 20:26             ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 15:50         ` Pawan Gupta
2024-10-02 19:40           ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 22/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 23/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 24/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 25/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 26/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:37   ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 19:57     ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 20:16       ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 21:15         ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01  0:39           ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01  1:46             ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:18               ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-13 14:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 28/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 29/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 30/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 31/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 32/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 33/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 34/34] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2024-09-17 17:04 ` [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2024-09-18  6:29   ` Kaplan, David

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