From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "thomas.lendacky@amd.com" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
"stable@vger.kernel.org" <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: x86: use CPUID to locate host page table reserved bits
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 00:11:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3efabf0da4954239662e90ea08d99212a654977a.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7b885f53-e0d3-2036-6a06-9cdcbb738ae2@redhat.com>
On Tue, 2019-12-10 at 10:17 +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 04/12/19 16:57, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> > On 12/4/19 9:40 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > > The comment in kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits refers to MKTME, but the same is
> > > actually
> > > true of SME and SEV. Just use CPUID[0x8000_0008].EAX[7:0] unconditionally
> > > if
> > > available, it is simplest and works even if memory is not encrypted.
> >
> > This isn't correct for AMD. The reduction in physical addressing is
> > correct. You can't set, e.g. bit 45, in the nested page table, because
> > that will be considered a reserved bit and generate an NPF. When memory
> > encryption is enabled today, bit 47 is the encryption indicator bit and
> > bits 46:43 must be zero or else an NPF is generated. The hardware uses
> > these bits internally based on the whether running as the hypervisor or
> > based on the ASID of the guest.
>
> kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits() must be conservative in that:
>
> 1) if a bit is reserved it _can_ return a value higher than its index
>
> 2) if a bit is used by the processor (for physical address or anything
> else) it _must_ return a value higher than its index.
>
> In the SEV case we're not obeying (2), because the function returns 43
> when the C bit is bit 47. The patch fixes that.
Could we guarantee that C-bit is always below bits reported by CPUID?
Thanks,
-Kai
>
> Paolo
>
> > Thanks,
> > Tom
> >
> > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > Reported-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > > ---
> > > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
> > > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > index 6f92b40d798c..1e4ee4f8de5f 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > > @@ -538,16 +538,20 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64
> > > accessed_mask,
> > > static u8 kvm_get_shadow_phys_bits(void)
> > > {
> > > /*
> > > - * boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is reduced when MKTME is detected
> > > - * in CPU detection code, but MKTME treats those reduced bits as
> > > - * 'keyID' thus they are not reserved bits. Therefore for MKTME
> > > - * we should still return physical address bits reported by CPUID.
> > > + * boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits is reduced when MKTME or SME are detected
> > > + * in CPU detection code, but the processor treats those reduced bits as
> > > + * 'keyID' thus they are not reserved bits. Therefore KVM needs to look
> > > at
> > > + * the physical address bits reported by CPUID.
> > > */
> > > - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TME) ||
> > > - WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000008))
> > > - return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
> > > + if (likely(boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008))
> > > + return cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff;
> > >
> > > - return cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff;
> > > + /*
> > > + * Quite weird to have VMX or SVM but not MAXPHYADDR; probably a VM with
> > > + * custom CPUID. Proceed with whatever the kernel found since these
> > > features
> > > + * aren't virtualizable (SME/SEV also require CPUIDs higher than
> > > 0x80000008).
> > > + */
> > > + return boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
> > > }
> > >
> > > static void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void)
> > >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-11 0:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-04 15:40 Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-04 15:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-12-10 9:19 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-10 15:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-12-04 15:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2019-12-10 3:53 ` Huang, Kai
2019-12-10 9:18 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-10 9:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-11 0:11 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2019-12-11 9:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2019-12-11 20:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2019-12-11 23:16 ` Huang, Kai
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