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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>,
	linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/cpufeatures: Cleanup AMD speculation feature bits
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 15:06:20 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7094ed9b-40f7-ba2b-55a6-cc5ab0b06bb9@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180126184915.ioqewp56orj2qhrt@pd.tnic>

On 1/26/2018 12:49 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 26, 2018 at 06:45:18PM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
>> On Fri, 2018-01-26 at 19:41 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>>> +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB           (13*32+12) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier MSR */
>>
>> Stray quotes.
> 
> No no, those quotes are magical. :)
> 
> They don't show the string in /proc/cpuinfo, see arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mkcapflags.sh
> 
>>> +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS               (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
>>
>> Please don't call it that. Call it X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS and leave
>> X86_FEATURE_IBRS to parallel X86_FEATURE_IBPB as the *software* bit
>> which is vendor-independent.
> 
> Do we have a X86_FEATURE_IBRS bit?
> 
> If so, then this bit should become
> 
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS      (13*32+14) /* "" Speculation Control MSR only (AMD) */
> 
> *with* the magic quotes.

So I like the idea of AMD_IBRS/AMD_IBPB/AMD_STIBP and then use the magic
quotes as appropriate.  We could probably use the magic quotes on
AMD_STIBP and set X86_FEATURE_STIBP when we see X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP.

Just my two cents.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-26 21:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-25 16:14 [PATCH v5 0/7] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 14:59   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:00   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 3/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 21:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 21:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 21:41     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 15:00   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:41     ` [PATCH] x86/cpufeatures: Cleanup AMD speculation feature bits Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 18:45       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:49         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 21:06           ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2018-01-26 21:52             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 21:59               ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 22:10                 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 23:14                   ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-27  8:49                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-27  9:27                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-27  9:37                       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-27 10:32                         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-27 13:18                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 4/7] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:00   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 5/7] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 18:10   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-25 19:53     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-25 22:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 15:01   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 6/7] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:01   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 7/7] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:02   ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 16:18     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 21:36   ` [PATCH v5 7/7] " Tim Chen

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