From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
To: arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linux-foundation.org,
dave.hansen@intel.com, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
ashok.raj@intel.com, mingo@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 0/7] Basic Speculation Control feature support
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:08 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516896855-7642-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> (raw)
Add the basic CPUID and MSR definitions for AMD and Intel, followed by
the complete no-brainer: Disable KPTI on Intel CPUs which set the
RDCL_NO bit to say that they don't need it, as well as others which are
known not to speculate such as old Atoms and even older 32-bit chips.
Alan will continue an archæological dig to round up some more entries
for that table.
Also blacklist the early Intel microcodes for Spectre mitigation features,
and add the basic support for indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(). The
latter is needed to protect userspace and complete the retpoline-based
mitigation. Patches on top of it are being bikeshedded as we speak...
v2: Cleanups, add AMD bits for STIBP/SPEC_CTRL.
v3: Add more CPUs to the exemption for KPTI and clean that up.
Add microcode blacklist (RFC).
v4: Roll in 'no speculation' list for CPUs not vulnerable to Spectre.
Cosmetic cleanups in microcode blacklist table.
v5: Update bad KBL microcode revision, blacklist all new features.
Add NSC to no_speculation list.
David Woodhouse (7):
x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to
Meltdown
x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2
microcodes
x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier)
support
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 15 ++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 12 ++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 +++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 2 -
10 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2018-01-25 16:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-25 16:14 David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 14:59 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:00 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 3/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 21:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 21:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 21:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 15:00 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:41 ` [PATCH] x86/cpufeatures: Cleanup AMD speculation feature bits Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 18:45 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 18:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 21:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-26 21:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 21:59 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 22:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 23:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-27 8:49 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-27 9:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-27 9:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-27 10:32 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-27 13:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 4/7] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:00 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 5/7] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 18:10 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-25 19:53 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-25 22:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-26 15:01 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 6/7] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:01 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:14 ` [PATCH v5 7/7] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 15:02 ` [tip:x86/pti] " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 16:18 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 21:36 ` [PATCH v5 7/7] " Tim Chen
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