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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage
Date: Sat, 05 Jun 2021 13:56:19 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87k0n8zfrw.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87mts4zkac.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>

On Sat, Jun 05 2021 at 12:18, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 04 2021 at 15:04, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> No bug is jumping out of the code as I took a brief look at it.  The
>> xbuf versus kbuf code looks a bit wonky, but I can't find a hole in it.
>
> I can....
>
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
> @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *t
>  		xbuf = vmalloc(count);
>  		if (!xbuf)
>  			return -ENOMEM;
> -		ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, NULL, &ubuf, xbuf, 0, -1);
> +		ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, xbuf, 0, -1);
>  		if (ret)
>  			goto out;
>  	}

But this whole user_regset_copyin() is pointless here. See below.

Thanks,

        tglx
---
 include/asm/fpu/xstate.h |    4 ----
 kernel/fpu/regset.c      |   40 ++++++++++++++++------------------------
 kernel/fpu/xstate.c      |   12 +++++++-----
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -112,8 +112,4 @@ void copy_supervisor_to_kernel(struct xr
 void copy_dynamic_supervisor_to_kernel(struct xregs_state *xstate, u64 mask);
 void copy_kernel_to_dynamic_supervisor(struct xregs_state *xstate, u64 mask);
 
-
-/* Validate an xstate header supplied by userspace (ptrace or sigreturn) */
-int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr);
-
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
 #include <asm/fpu/signal.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/regset.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
 
 /*
@@ -108,7 +111,7 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *t
 		  const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
 {
 	struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
-	struct xregs_state *xsave;
+	struct xregs_state *xbuf = NULL;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
@@ -120,32 +123,21 @@ int xstateregs_set(struct task_struct *t
 	if (pos != 0 || count != fpu_user_xstate_size)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	xsave = &fpu->state.xsave;
-
-	fpu__prepare_write(fpu);
-
-	if (using_compacted_format()) {
-		if (kbuf)
-			ret = copy_kernel_to_xstate(xsave, kbuf);
-		else
-			ret = copy_user_to_xstate(xsave, ubuf);
-	} else {
-		ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, xsave, 0, -1);
-		if (!ret)
-			ret = validate_user_xstate_header(&xsave->header);
+	if (!kbuf) {
+		xbuf = vmalloc(count);
+		if (!xbuf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (copy_from_user(xbuf, ubuf, count)) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * mxcsr reserved bits must be masked to zero for security reasons.
-	 */
-	xsave->i387.mxcsr &= mxcsr_feature_mask;
-
-	/*
-	 * In case of failure, mark all states as init:
-	 */
-	if (ret)
-		fpstate_init(&fpu->state);
+	fpu__prepare_write(fpu);
+	ret = copy_kernel_to_xstate(&fpu->state.xsave, kbuf ? kbuf : xbuf);
 
+out:
+	vfree(xbuf);
 	return ret;
 }
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ int using_compacted_format(void)
 }
 
 /* Validate an xstate header supplied by userspace (ptrace or sigreturn) */
-int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr)
+static int validate_user_xstate_header(const struct xstate_header *hdr)
 {
 	/* No unknown or supervisor features may be set */
 	if (hdr->xfeatures & ~xfeatures_mask_user())
@@ -1172,14 +1172,16 @@ int copy_kernel_to_xstate(struct xregs_s
 	 */
 	xsave->header.xfeatures |= hdr.xfeatures;
 
+	/* mxcsr reserved bits must be masked to zero for security reasons. */
+	xsave->i387.mxcsr &= mxcsr_feature_mask;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * Convert from a ptrace or sigreturn standard-format user-space buffer to
- * kernel XSAVES format and copy to the target thread. This is called from
- * xstateregs_set(), as well as potentially from the sigreturn() and
- * rt_sigreturn() system calls.
+ * Convert from a sigreturn standard-format user-space buffer to kernel
+ * XSAVES format and copy to the target thread. This is called from the
+ * sigreturn() and rt_sigreturn() system calls.
  */
 int copy_user_to_xstate(struct xregs_state *xsave, const void __user *ubuf)
 {

      reply	other threads:[~2021-06-05 11:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-02  9:55 Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 1/8] selftests/x86: Test signal frame XSTATE header corruption handling Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 12:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:15     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 13:16       ` Shuah Khan
2021-06-02 15:59   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:02     ` [patch V2a " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 2/8] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 13:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:46     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:58   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 3/8] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:30     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-03 19:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 4/8] x86/fpu: Limit xstate copy size in xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 17:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 5/8] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:01   ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 11:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:24   ` [patch " Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 6/8] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 7/8] x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02  9:55 ` [patch 8/8] x86/fpu: Deduplicate copy_xxx_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 16:56   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02 21:28 ` [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 14:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 16:27     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 17:46     ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-04 18:14       ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-05 10:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 11:56     ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]

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