From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 3/8] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer
Date: Thu, 3 Jun 2021 21:28:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YLkteEfyD3mqcCnO@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6220f2da-1d5b-843c-fa82-58a28fbcdd6b@kernel.org>
On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 10:30:05AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> Think "complex microarchitectural conditions".
Ah, the magic phrase.
> How about:
>
> As far as I can tell, both Intel and AMD consider it to be
> architecturally valid for XRSTOR to fail with #PF but nonetheless change
> user state. The actual conditions under which this might occur are
> unclear [1], but it seems plausible that this might be triggered if one
> sibling thread unmaps a page and invalidates the shared TLB while
> another sibling thread is executing XRSTOR on the page in question.
>
> __fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers are
> preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the
> fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but
> modify the registers. If this happens, then there is a window in which
> __fpu__restore_sig() could schedule out and the victim task could
> schedule back in without reloading its own FPU registers. This would
> result in part of the FPU state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting
> to load leaking into the victim task's user-visible state.
>
> Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this
> situation from corrupting any state.
>
> [1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex
> microarchitectural conditions".
Yap, very nice, thanks!
> > I'm wondering if that comment can simply be above the TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD
> > testing, standalone, instead of having it in an empty else? And then get
> > rid of that else.
>
> I'm fine either way.
Ok, then let's aim for common, no-surprise-there patterns as we're in a
mine field here anyway.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-03 19:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-02 9:55 [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 9:55 ` [patch 1/8] selftests/x86: Test signal frame XSTATE header corruption handling Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 12:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:15 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 13:16 ` Shuah Khan
2021-06-02 15:59 ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:02 ` [patch V2a " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 9:55 ` [patch 2/8] x86/fpu: Prevent state corruption in __fpu__restore_sig() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 13:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 14:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:58 ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 9:55 ` [patch 3/8] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-03 19:28 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-06-02 9:55 ` [patch 4/8] x86/fpu: Limit xstate copy size in xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 17:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-02 9:55 ` [patch 5/8] x86/fpu: Sanitize xstateregs_set() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 16:01 ` [patch V2 " Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 11:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-03 17:24 ` [patch " Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02 9:55 ` [patch 6/8] x86/fpu: Add address range checks to copy_user_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 9:55 ` [patch 7/8] x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-02 9:55 ` [patch 8/8] x86/fpu: Deduplicate copy_xxx_to_xstate() Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-03 16:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-06-02 21:28 ` [patch 0/8] x86/fpu: Mop up XSAVES and related damage Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 14:05 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 16:27 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-06-04 17:46 ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-04 18:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-04 22:04 ` Dave Hansen
2021-06-05 10:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-06-05 11:56 ` Thomas Gleixner
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