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From: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 15:09:04 +0930	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87obki23uv.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJ5Ap18DmAR6T5REgxffeKp08vtuxB7CXxQ66ntXsf0HA@mail.gmail.com>

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes:

> On Thu, Sep 20, 2012 at 3:14 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> As part of the effort to create a stronger boundary between root and
>> kernel, Chrome OS wants to be able to enforce that kernel modules are
>> being loaded only from our read-only crypto-hash verified (dm_verity)
>> root filesystem. Since the init_module syscall hands the kernel a module
>> as a memory blob, no reasoning about the origin of the blob can be made.
>>
>> Earlier proposals for appending signatures to kernel modules would not be
>> useful in Chrome OS, since it would involve adding an additional set of
>> keys to our kernel and builds for no good reason: we already trust the
>> contents of our root filesystem. We don't need to verify those kernel
>> modules a second time. Having to do signature checking on module loading
>> would slow us down and be redundant. All we need to know is where a
>> module is coming from so we can say yes/no to loading it.
>>
>> If a file descriptor is used as the source of a kernel module, many more
>> things can be reasoned about. In Chrome OS's case, we could enforce that
>> the module lives on the filesystem we expect it to live on.  In the case
>> of IMA (or other LSMs), it would be possible, for example, to examine
>> extended attributes that may contain signatures over the contents of
>> the module.
>>
>> This introduces a new syscall (on x86), similar to init_module, that has
>> only two arguments. The first argument is used as a file descriptor to
>> the module and the second argument is a pointer to the NULL terminated
>> string of module arguments.
>
> Hi Rusty,
>
> Is this likely to land in the 3.7 change window? I'd really like to
> get the syscall number assigned so I can start sending patches to
> glibc, kmod, etc. My tree is here, FWIW:

No, unfortunately it's a little late and there were issues with ARM
signoffs and syscall numbers...

> http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/module-fd-syscall

Messy merge due to the module signing stuff going in :(

Please rebase on top of my kernel.org modules-next branch, and I'll pull
into my modules-wip branch for 3.8.

Thanks,
Rusty.

  reply	other threads:[~2012-10-04  5:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 56+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-09-20 22:14 Kees Cook
2012-09-20 22:14 ` [PATCH 2/4] security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook Kees Cook
2012-09-21 12:42   ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-20 22:14 ` [PATCH 3/4] ARM: add finit_module syscall to ARM Kees Cook
2012-09-21 13:15   ` Arnd Bergmann
2012-09-21 14:59     ` Russell King
2012-09-21 15:43       ` Kees Cook
2012-09-20 22:15 ` [PATCH 4/4] add finit_module syscall to asm-generic Kees Cook
2012-09-21  2:22 ` [PATCH 1/4] module: add syscall to load module from fd James Morris
2012-09-21  3:07   ` Kees Cook
2012-09-21  3:09   ` Mimi Zohar
2012-09-21 17:56   ` John Johansen
2012-10-03 22:40 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-04  5:39   ` Rusty Russell [this message]
2012-10-04 12:50     ` Mimi Zohar
2012-10-05  3:50       ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-05  7:12         ` Kees Cook
2012-10-04 20:28     ` Kees Cook
2012-10-09 21:54 ` Michael Kerrisk
2012-10-09 21:58   ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-09 22:03     ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-09 22:09       ` H. Peter Anvin
     [not found]         ` <CAKgNAkjfkbYOQocuGRAKU=0P2CQCvmedhRMJZPnkUMnnxSOsqg@mail.gmail.com>
2012-10-10  5:54           ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-11 22:16         ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-12  5:16           ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-18  3:12             ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-18  5:39               ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-10-18 12:59               ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-22  7:39                 ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-23  2:37                   ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-10-23  3:40                     ` Kees Cook
2012-10-23  4:08                       ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-10-23 15:42                         ` Kees Cook
2012-10-23 15:45                           ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-23 16:25                           ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-10-24  3:06                             ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-23  7:38                   ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-30 21:57                   ` Kees Cook
2012-11-01  1:03                     ` Rusty Russell
2012-12-21  0:01                   ` Michael Kerrisk
2013-01-03  0:12                     ` Rusty Russell
2013-01-06 18:59                       ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2013-01-06 20:24                         ` Kees Cook
2013-01-07  1:41                           ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2013-01-09 17:29                         ` Lucas De Marchi
2013-01-10  0:55                           ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-18  4:24           ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-18  8:05             ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2012-10-18 14:26               ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-18 15:28                 ` Kees Cook
2012-10-18 15:30                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-19  2:23                 ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-19  2:54                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-19 10:46                     ` Alon Ziv
2012-10-20  4:05                     ` Rusty Russell
2012-10-04 20:22 [PATCH v5] " Kees Cook
2012-10-04 20:22 ` [PATCH 1/4] " Kees Cook

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