From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/8] x86/feature: Detect the x86 IBRS feature to control Speculation
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 18:12:16 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a00d764b835898844df2b01ce506ab03e786a744.1515204614.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1515204614.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1515204614.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
cpuid ax=0x7, return rdx bit 26 to indicate presence of this feature
IA32_SPEC_CTRL (0x48)
IA32_SPEC_CTRL, bit0 – Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
If IBRS is set, near returns and near indirect jumps/calls will not allow
their predicted target address to be controlled by code that executed in
a less privileged prediction mode before the IBRS mode was last written
with a value of 1 or on another logical processor so long as all RSB
entries from the previous less privileged prediction mode are overwritten.
* Thus a near indirect jump/call/return may be affected by code in a
less privileged prediction mode that executed AFTER IBRS mode was last
written with a value of 1
* There is no need to clear IBRS before writing it with a value of
1. Unconditionally writing it with a value of 1 after the prediction
mode change is sufficient
* Note: IBRS is not required in order to isolate branch predictions for
SMM or SGX enclaves
* Code executed by a sibling logical processor cannot control indirect
jump/call/return predicted target when IBRS is set
* SMEP will prevent supervisor mode using RSB entries filled by user code;
this can reduce the need for software to overwrite RSB entries
CPU performance could be reduced when running with IBRS set.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 07cdd17..5ee0737 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS ( 7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
#define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+19) /* Control Speculation Control */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 34c4922..f881add 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
#define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e
#define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f
+#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048
+#define SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_DISABLE_IBRS (0 << 0)
+#define SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS (1 << 0)
+
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2
#define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 05459ad..bc50c40 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT, CPUID_EBX, 25, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CPUID_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 26, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3, CPUID_EBX, 1, 0x00000010, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x00000010, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 1 },
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 800104c..5e56275 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS ( 7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
#define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+19) /* Control Speculation Control */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
--
2.9.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-06 2:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-06 2:12 [PATCH v2 0/8] IBRS patch series Tim Chen
2018-01-06 2:12 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-01-06 12:56 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] x86/feature: Detect the x86 IBRS feature to control Speculation Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:14 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-07 18:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-09 18:13 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-09 18:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 16:14 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 10:39 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 17:53 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-09 17:58 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 22:59 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-18 23:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-06 2:12 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] x86/enter: MACROS to set/clear IBRS Tim Chen
2018-01-07 12:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 17:12 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-07 18:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 22:24 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-06 2:12 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts Tim Chen
2018-01-07 19:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-06 2:12 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] x86/spec_ctrl: Add sysctl knobs to enable/disable SPEC_CTRL feature Tim Chen
2018-01-06 3:12 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-08 12:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 16:14 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 17:28 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-08 17:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 19:34 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-08 19:52 ` Lu, Hongjiu
2018-01-09 10:40 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 17:55 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-09 18:13 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-09 20:31 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-27 13:59 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-27 14:26 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-06 8:54 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 18:10 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-06 21:25 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-07 8:20 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 14:41 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-06 17:33 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-06 17:41 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-06 19:22 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-06 19:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-06 21:32 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-06 21:34 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-06 21:41 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-06 21:44 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-06 21:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-06 21:46 ` Is: Linus, name for 'spectre' variable. Was:Re: " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-06 18:23 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-06 18:20 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-08 15:08 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 15:29 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-08 17:02 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-08 15:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 15:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-09 0:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-09 18:05 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-06 2:12 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] x86/idle: Disable IBRS entering idle and enable it on wakeup Tim Chen
2018-01-06 2:12 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] x86/microcode: Recheck IBRS features on microcode reload Tim Chen
2018-01-06 12:09 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-09 0:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-06 2:12 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] x86: Do not use dynamic IBRS if retpoline is enabled Tim Chen
2018-01-06 2:12 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] x86: Use IBRS for firmware update path Tim Chen
2018-01-06 8:55 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 8:57 ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 6:43 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] IBRS patch series Tim Chen
2018-01-06 12:00 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-06 12:11 ` Woodhouse, David
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