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* [PATCH] ima: fix kexec measurement buffer overflow after failed loads
@ 2026-11-08 19:04 Jérémy Jean
  2026-11-10 20:07 ` Mike Rapoport
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jérémy Jean @ 2026-11-08 19:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton, Baoquan He, Mike Rapoport, Pasha Tatashin,
	Pratyush Yadav, Mimi Zohar, Roberto Sassu, Dmitry Kasatkin
  Cc: Eric Snowberg, linux-integrity, linux-security-module,
	linux-kernel, kexec, Jérémy Jean, stable

When kexec_file_load() fails to install a new image, it can leave the
global IMA scratch buffer larger than the IMA segment of the current
image. When that image is executed, ima_update_kexec_buffer() copies
the larger log past the end of its reserved segment. In a test, KASAN
reports it as:

  BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in ima_update_kexec_buffer+0x265/0x280
  Write of size 868426 at addr ffffc9000004e000 by task init/1
  ...
  Call Trace:
   ...
   __asan_memcpy+0x3b/0x60
   ima_update_kexec_buffer+0x265/0x280
   ...
   blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x88/0xb0
   kernel_restart_prepare+0x18/0x40
   kernel_kexec+0xe4/0x130

Limit the dump to the smaller value between the scratch size and the
installed image segment size. Update the IMA mapping only after
machine_kexec_post_load() succeeds.

Fixes: 9f0ec4b16f2b ("ima: kexec: move IMA log copy from kexec load to execute")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
---
 kernel/kexec_file.c                | 6 ++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c | 8 +++++---
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index b668ce8d68eed..0b3245389b758 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -206,11 +206,13 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
 
 static int kexec_post_load(struct kimage *image, unsigned long flags)
 {
+	int ret = machine_kexec_post_load(image);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
-	if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH))
+	if (!ret && !(flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH))
 		ima_kexec_post_load(image);
 #endif
-	return machine_kexec_post_load(image);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index 0d845693a1f78..f7be8d85bb9a7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ static int ima_alloc_kexec_file_buf(size_t segment_size)
 
 	ima_free_kexec_file_buf(&ima_kexec_file);
 
-	/* segment size can't change between kexec load and execute */
 	ima_kexec_file.buf = vmalloc(segment_size);
 	if (!ima_kexec_file.buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -98,12 +97,14 @@ static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
 	struct ima_kexec_hdr khdr;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	/* segment size can't change between kexec load and execute */
 	if (!ima_kexec_file.buf) {
 		pr_err("Kexec file buf not allocated\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	/* A failed replacement load may have resized the scratch buffer. */
+	ima_kexec_file.size = min_t(size_t, ima_kexec_file.size, segment_size);
+
 	memset(&khdr, 0, sizeof(khdr));
 	khdr.version = 1;
 	/*
@@ -239,7 +240,8 @@ static int ima_update_kexec_buffer(struct notifier_block *self,
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	ret = ima_dump_measurement_list(&buf_size, &buf, kexec_segment_size);
+	ret = ima_dump_measurement_list(&buf_size, &buf,
+					kexec_image->ima_buffer_size);
 
 	if (ret)
 		pr_err("Dump measurements failed. Error:%d\n", ret);
-- 
2.47.3


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] ima: fix kexec measurement buffer overflow after failed loads
  2026-11-08 19:04 [PATCH] ima: fix kexec measurement buffer overflow after failed loads Jérémy Jean
@ 2026-11-10 20:07 ` Mike Rapoport
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Mike Rapoport @ 2026-11-10 20:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jérémy Jean
  Cc: Andrew Morton, Baoquan He, Pasha Tatashin, Pratyush Yadav,
	Mimi Zohar, Roberto Sassu, Dmitry Kasatkin, Eric Snowberg,
	linux-integrity, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, kexec,
	stable

On Sun, Nov 08, 2026 at 07:04:04PM +0000, Jérémy Jean wrote:
> When kexec_file_load() fails to install a new image, it can leave the
> global IMA scratch buffer larger than the IMA segment of the current
> image. When that image is executed, ima_update_kexec_buffer() copies
> the larger log past the end of its reserved segment. In a test, KASAN
> reports it as:

...

> Limit the dump to the smaller value between the scratch size and the
> installed image segment size. Update the IMA mapping only after
> machine_kexec_post_load() succeeds.

These are two different bugs and the changelog only explains the first.
The second one is that if machine_kexec_post_load() fails (e.g. -ENOMEM
in trans_pgd on arm64), ima_kexec_buffer is already switched to the
segment of the image that is about to be freed, so the installed image
loses the IMA update and kexec -e writes into freed pages.
Please spell this out, or better split it into a separate patch.

> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> @@ -206,11 +206,13 @@ kimage_validate_signature(struct kimage *image)
>  
>  static int kexec_post_load(struct kimage *image, unsigned long flags)
>  {
> +	int ret = machine_kexec_post_load(image);
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
> -	if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH))
> +	if (!ret && !(flags & KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH))
>  		ima_kexec_post_load(image);
>  #endif
> -	return machine_kexec_post_load(image);
> +	return ret;

Nit: an early "if (ret) return ret;" reads better than folding the error
into the IMA condition.

> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
> @@ -98,12 +97,14 @@ static int ima_dump_measurement_list(unsigned long *buffer_size, void **buffer,
> +	/* A failed replacement load may have resized the scratch buffer. */
> +	ima_kexec_file.size = min_t(size_t, ima_kexec_file.size, segment_size);

This prevents the overflow, but it treats the symptom at execute time.
The actual problem is that ima_add_kexec_buffer() updates global state
(ima_kexec_file and kexec_segment_size) for an image that may never be
installed.

When the failed load had a smaller measurement list (with staging the
list can shrink), the dump is still truncated to the failed image's
size and the next kernel gets an incomplete log. kexec_segment_size
reported in the "kexec_execute" event is also the failed image's one.

With the first hunk ima_kexec_post_load() runs only for an image that
is going to be installed, so wouldn't it be cleaner to (re)size the
scratch buffer and kexec_segment_size there, from image->ima_buffer_size?
Then the comment you removed would actually become true.

> @@ -239,7 +240,8 @@ static int ima_update_kexec_buffer(struct notifier_block *self,
> -	ret = ima_dump_measurement_list(&buf_size, &buf, kexec_segment_size);
> +	ret = ima_dump_measurement_list(&buf_size, &buf,
> +					kexec_image->ima_buffer_size);

ima_kexec_buffer is not tied to kexec_image. After a successful
kexec_file_load() followed by KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD or by a successful
kexec_load(), the old image is freed but ima_kexec_buffer still maps its
pages. kexec_image->ima_buffer_size is 0 for a kexec_load() image, so
with this patch the dump fails, but buf_size is still the header size
and memcpy() writes it into freed pages.

That's pre-existing and not a reason to hold this patch, but it's the
same class of bug and I think IMA should check that ima_kexec_buffer
belongs to kexec_image (or drop the mapping when the image is replaced)
rather than rely on sizes matching.

--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-10 20:07 UTC | newest]

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2026-11-08 19:04 [PATCH] ima: fix kexec measurement buffer overflow after failed loads Jérémy Jean
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