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From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: "Baek Kyu, Kim" <pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
	Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] mm/secretmem: Keep locked memory accounting until inode eviction
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 10:30:28 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <awKoJJ6bxqBltonr@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261121164020.1465498-1-pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>

Hi,

Please don't send vN+1 as a reply to vN next time please.

On Sun, Nov 22, 2026 at 01:40:20AM +0900, Baek Kyu, Kim wrote:
> A secretmem inode can outlive its original file. An O_PATH descriptor
> opened through /proc/self/fd keeps the inode and its unevictable folios
> alive after the mapping and original descriptor are closed. The file
> release path nevertheless drops the locked-memory charge, allowing the
> same user to reuse RLIMIT_MEMLOCK while those folios remain allocated.
> 
> Move private-state and locked-memory accounting cleanup to inode eviction,
> after truncating the page cache. Keep secretmem_users active over the same
> lifetime so that the hibernation guard covers retained secret pages.
> 
> Allocate private state before inode creation and release it if the
> secure-inode helper fails. Attach it immediately after creation so
> later failures can use iput() for cleanup. An LSM denial inside the
> helper can call iput() before i_private is set; skip private cleanup
> at eviction when i_private is NULL.
> 
> On arm64 QEMU with an 8 KiB RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, the original kernel allowed
> an additional 4 KiB secretmem fault while O_PATH retained two pages.
> v2 rejected that fault with SIGBUS and allowed it after O_PATH closed.
> Injected LSM denial and file-allocation failure completed without a
> crash; file-allocation cleanup returned secretmem_users to zero.
> KASAN, lockdep, hibernation and long-running concurrency were not
> tested in this v2 run.
> 
> Fixes: 97d34aa65c29 ("mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages")
> Signed-off-by: Baek Kyu, Kim <pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>
> ---
> Changes in v2:
>   - Allocate state before inode creation, as Mike Rapoport suggested,
>     and free it if the secure-inode helper fails.
>   - Guard private-state cleanup in secretmem_evict_inode() because an
>     LSM denial can call iput() before i_private is set.
> 
> Link to v1: https://lists.openwall.net/linux-kernel/2026/10/30/1883
> 
>  mm/secretmem.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
>  1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
> index b3f79ad56790..5a7378b62bb2 100644
> --- a/mm/secretmem.c
> +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
> @@ -189,14 +189,7 @@ static void secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
>  	free_uid(state->user);
>  	kfree(state);
>  	inode->i_private = NULL;
> -}
> -
> -static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> -{
>  	atomic_dec(&secretmem_users);
> -	secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
> -
> -	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  static int secretmem_mmap_prepare(struct vm_area_desc *desc)
> @@ -216,7 +209,6 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>  }
>  
>  static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
> -	.release	= secretmem_release,
>  	.mmap_prepare	= secretmem_mmap_prepare,
>  };
>  
> @@ -264,39 +256,34 @@ static const struct inode_operations secretmem_iops = {
>  
>  static struct vfsmount *secretmem_mnt;
>  
> -static int secretmem_init_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
> -{
> -	struct secretmem_inode_state *state;
> -
> -	state = kzalloc_obj(*state);
> -	if (!state)
> -		return -ENOMEM;
> -
> -	state->user = get_uid(current_user());
> -	inode->i_private = state;
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
>  static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
>  {
> +	struct secretmem_inode_state *state;
>  	struct file *file;
>  	struct inode *inode;
>  	const char *anon_name = "[secretmem]";
>  	int err;
>  
> +	state = kzalloc_obj(*state);
> +	if (!state)
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +	state->user = get_uid(current_user());
> +
>  	inode = anon_inode_make_secure_inode(secretmem_mnt->mnt_sb, anon_name, NULL);
> -	if (IS_ERR(inode))
> +	if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
> +		free_uid(state->user);
> +		kfree(state);

Please don't do cleanups inside if (err), use goto.

See https://docs.kernel.org/process/coding-style.html#centralized-exiting-of-functions

>  		return ERR_CAST(inode);
> +	}
>  
> -	err = secretmem_init_inode_priv(inode);
> -	if (err)
> -		goto err_free_inode;
> +	inode->i_private = state;
> +	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
>  
>  	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, secretmem_mnt, "secretmem",
>  				 O_RDWR | O_LARGEFILE, &secretmem_fops);
>  	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
>  		err = PTR_ERR(file);
> -		goto err_free_priv;
> +		goto err_free_inode;

I think here we lost free_uid().

>  	}
>  
>  	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER);
> @@ -309,11 +296,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
>  	inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
>  	inode->i_size = 0;
>  
> -	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
> -
>  	return file;
> -err_free_priv:
> -	secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);

What prevents moving this between iput() and return err?

>  err_free_inode:
>  	iput(inode);
>  	return ERR_PTR(err);
> @@ -335,6 +318,20 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
>  	return FD_ADD(flags & O_CLOEXEC, secretmem_file_create(flags));
>  }
>  
> +static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> +	truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
> +	clear_inode(inode);
> +	/* The filesystem root and failed secure inodes have no private state. */
> +	if (inode->i_private)
> +		secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
> +}
> +
> +static const struct super_operations secretmem_super_ops = {
> +	.statfs		= simple_statfs,
> +	.evict_inode	= secretmem_evict_inode,
> +};
> +
>  static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>  {
>  	struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx;
> @@ -342,6 +339,7 @@ static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>  	ctx = init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC);
>  	if (!ctx)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +	ctx->ops = &secretmem_super_ops;
>  
>  	return 0;
>  }

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-22  8:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-30 15:24 [PATCH] " Baek Kyu, Kim
2026-11-18 22:59 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-19  7:36   ` Mike Rapoport
2026-11-20  9:32     ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-21 16:40 ` [PATCH v2] " Baek Kyu, Kim
2026-11-22  8:30   ` Mike Rapoport [this message]

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