From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Naveen N Rao (AMD)" <naveen@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@amd.com>,
Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/27] KVM: SVM: Add helper to check if Secure AVIC is enabled for a guest
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 13:35:11 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b27e0ce6-08c9-4f2c-a07e-8bd523ac516e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5e077730f0d598623cca4438617f38cf04820196.1783490022.git.naveen@kernel.org>
On 7/8/26 01:32, Naveen N Rao (AMD) wrote:
> Add a helper snp_is_secure_avic_enabled() along the lines of the similar
> helper for Secure TSC to check if Secure AVIC is enabled in the VMSA SEV
> Features for a SEV-SNP guest.
>
> Note: Enabling Secure AVIC in the VMSA SEV Features puts the SEV-SNP
> guest in Secure AVIC "mode", and it is up to the guest to then "enable"
> Secure AVIC through the Secure AVIC Control MSR. While the use of
> "enabled" in the helper might sound like a misnomer, it reflects the
> fact that KVM has no visibility into whether the guest has actually
> enabled Secure AVIC or not. For all practical purposes, KVM assumes that
> the guest has Secure AVIC enabled. Since a Secure AVIC mode guest is
> extremely restricted, it is in the best interest of the guest to enable
> Secure AVIC at the earliest.
The last sentence probably isn't needed.
And typically the function isn't introduced until it is used. But if no
one has any objection:
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 8 ++++++++
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> index 42ececa8963d..5857b942957b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> @@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV
> #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)
> #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
> #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9)
> +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_AVIC BIT(16)
>
> #define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 616e45624f4c..1157d022bac1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -1013,6 +1013,7 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
> int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private);
> struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa);
> +bool snp_is_secure_avic_enabled(struct kvm *kvm);
> #else
> static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page_node(int node, gfp_t gfp)
> {
> @@ -1050,6 +1051,7 @@ static inline struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return NULL;
> }
> static inline void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa) {}
> +static inline bool snp_is_secure_avic_enabled(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; }
> #endif
>
> /* vmenter.S */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 74fb15551e83..686227a15328 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -211,6 +211,14 @@ static bool snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
> !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_snp_guest(kvm));
> }
>
> +bool snp_is_secure_avic_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm);
> +
> + return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_AVIC) &&
> + !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_snp_guest(kvm));
> +}
> +
> /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
> static bool __sev_recycle_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid)
> {
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-13 18:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-08 6:31 [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-SNP Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/27] x86/apic: Propagate APIC_SPIV writes to hv for " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-10 2:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-10 15:02 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-11 4:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-13 17:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 8:57 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/apic: Drop savic_eoi() in favor of native_apic_msr_eoi() " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 9:02 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/27] x86/kvm: Disable PV_SEND_IPI if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 9:42 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/27] x86/apic: Use AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI VMGEXIT for Secure AVIC IPI handling Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 10:03 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add Secure AVIC CPU feature Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 18:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/27] KVM: SVM: Add helper to check if Secure AVIC is enabled for a guest Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 18:35 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: SVM: Set guest_apic_protected if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/27] kvm: irqfd: Have kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass() take struct kvm pointer Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: SVM: Disable IRQ bypass for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: SVM: Add avic_ipiv_is_soft_disabled() as a wrapper around enable_ipiv Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: SVM: Disable IPIv for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: SVM: Short-circuit a few AVIC flows " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: SVM: Warn if we ever receive AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS #VMEXIT Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: SVM: Do not inhibit AVIC for SEV-SNP guests if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: SVM: Set VGIF in VMSA area for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: SVM: Add handler for VMGEXIT Secure AVIC NAE event Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: x86: Add a new kvm_x86_op protected_apic_has_injectable_intr() Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: SVM: Implement kvm_x86_ops->protected_apic_has_injectable_intr() for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: SVM: Implement kvm_x86_ops->protected_apic_has_interrupt() " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: SVM: Add interrupt delivery support for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for incomplete IPI handling for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for injecting NMIs for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: SVM: Mandate use of split irqchip for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: SVM: Do not inject exceptions " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept exceptions for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: SVM: Advertise Secure AVIC support for SEV-SNP guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 9:20 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-SNP Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao
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