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From: "Naveen N Rao (AMD)" <naveen@kernel.org>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@amd.com>,
	Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 06/27] KVM: SVM: Add helper to check if Secure AVIC is enabled for a guest
Date: Wed,  8 Jul 2026 12:02:04 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5e077730f0d598623cca4438617f38cf04820196.1783490022.git.naveen@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1783490022.git.naveen@kernel.org>

Add a helper snp_is_secure_avic_enabled() along the lines of the similar
helper for Secure TSC to check if Secure AVIC is enabled in the VMSA SEV
Features for a SEV-SNP guest.

Note: Enabling Secure AVIC in the VMSA SEV Features puts the SEV-SNP
guest in Secure AVIC "mode", and it is up to the guest to then "enable"
Secure AVIC through the Secure AVIC Control MSR. While the use of
"enabled" in the helper might sound like a misnomer, it reflects the
fact that KVM has no visibility into whether the guest has actually
enabled Secure AVIC or not. For all practical purposes, KVM assumes that
the guest has Secure AVIC enabled. Since a Secure AVIC mode guest is
extremely restricted, it is in the best interest of the guest to enable
Secure AVIC at the earliest.

Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h     | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c     | 8 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 42ececa8963d..5857b942957b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION		BIT(4)
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP				BIT(5)
 #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC				BIT(9)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_AVIC			BIT(16)
 
 #define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID			BIT_ULL(63)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 616e45624f4c..1157d022bac1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -1013,6 +1013,7 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
 int sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool is_private);
 struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa);
+bool snp_is_secure_avic_enabled(struct kvm *kvm);
 #else
 static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page_node(int node, gfp_t gfp)
 {
@@ -1050,6 +1051,7 @@ static inline struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return NULL;
 }
 static inline void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa) {}
+static inline bool snp_is_secure_avic_enabled(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; }
 #endif
 
 /* vmenter.S */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 74fb15551e83..686227a15328 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -211,6 +211,14 @@ static bool snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
 	       !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_snp_guest(kvm));
 }
 
+bool snp_is_secure_avic_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm);
+
+	return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_AVIC) &&
+	       !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_snp_guest(kvm));
+}
+
 /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
 static bool __sev_recycle_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid)
 {
-- 
2.54.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-08  6:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-08  6:31 [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-SNP Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/27] x86/apic: Propagate APIC_SPIV writes to hv for " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-10  2:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-10 15:02     ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-11  4:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-13 17:38       ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14  8:57         ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/apic: Drop savic_eoi() in favor of native_apic_msr_eoi() " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:43   ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14  9:02     ` Naveen N Rao
2026-10-06  6:16       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-10-08  7:35         ` Naveen N Rao
2026-10-15 13:31           ` Sean Christopherson
2026-11-02 18:45             ` Naveen N Rao
2026-11-05  1:04               ` Sean Christopherson
2026-10-06  3:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-10-08  7:57     ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/27] x86/kvm: Disable PV_SEND_IPI if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14  9:42     ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/27] x86/apic: Use AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI VMGEXIT for Secure AVIC IPI handling Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:59   ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 10:03     ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add Secure AVIC CPU feature Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 18:32   ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-08  6:32 ` Naveen N Rao (AMD) [this message]
2026-07-13 18:35   ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/27] KVM: SVM: Add helper to check if Secure AVIC is enabled for a guest Tom Lendacky
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: SVM: Set guest_apic_protected if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/27] kvm: irqfd: Have kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass() take struct kvm pointer Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: SVM: Disable IRQ bypass for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: SVM: Add avic_ipiv_is_soft_disabled() as a wrapper around enable_ipiv Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: SVM: Disable IPIv for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: SVM: Short-circuit a few AVIC flows " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: SVM: Warn if we ever receive AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS #VMEXIT Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: SVM: Do not inhibit AVIC for SEV-SNP guests if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: SVM: Set VGIF in VMSA area for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: SVM: Add handler for VMGEXIT Secure AVIC NAE event Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-08-26 16:09   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-22 15:01     ` Naveen N Rao
2026-09-30 14:43       ` Naveen N Rao
2026-09-30 15:45         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-09-30 19:54           ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: x86: Add a new kvm_x86_op protected_apic_has_injectable_intr() Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: SVM: Implement kvm_x86_ops->protected_apic_has_injectable_intr() for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: SVM: Implement kvm_x86_ops->protected_apic_has_interrupt() " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: SVM: Add interrupt delivery support for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for incomplete IPI handling for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for injecting NMIs for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: SVM: Mandate use of split irqchip for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: SVM: Do not inject exceptions " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept exceptions for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: SVM: Advertise Secure AVIC support for SEV-SNP guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08  9:20 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-SNP Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao

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