From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Thomas Hellström (VMware)" <thomas_os@shipmail.org>,
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, pv-drivers@vmware.com,
linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Thomas Hellstrom" <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Heiko Carstens" <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] drm/ttm, drm/vmwgfx: Correctly support support AMD memory encryption
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2019 12:38:25 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b54bd492-9702-5ad7-95da-daf20918d3d9@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190903131504.18935-4-thomas_os@shipmail.org>
This whole thing looks like a fascinating collection of hacks. :)
ttm is taking a stack-alllocated "VMA" and handing it to vmf_insert_*()
which obviously are expecting "real" VMAs that are linked into the mm.
It's extracting some pgprot_t information from the real VMA, making a
psuedo-temporary VMA, then passing the temporary one back into the
insertion functions:
> static vm_fault_t ttm_bo_vm_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> {
...
> struct vm_area_struct cvma;
...
> if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIXEDMAP)
> ret = vmf_insert_mixed(&cvma, address,
> __pfn_to_pfn_t(pfn, PFN_DEV));
> else
> ret = vmf_insert_pfn(&cvma, address, pfn);
I can totally see why this needs new exports. But, man, it doesn't seem
like something we want to keep *feeding*.
The real problem here is that the encryption bits from the device VMA's
"true" vma->vm_page_prot don't match the ones that actually get
inserted, probably because the device ptes need the encryption bits
cleared but the system memory PTEs need them set *and* they're mixed
under one VMA.
The thing we need to stop is having mixed encryption rules under one VMA.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-03 19:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-03 13:15 [PATCH v2 0/4] Have TTM support SEV encryption with coherent memory Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 13:15 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/mm: Export force_dma_unencrypted Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 13:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-03 14:32 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 16:22 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-03 20:46 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 21:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-04 6:58 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-04 7:32 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-04 12:22 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-04 17:28 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 15:14 ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-03 18:50 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 13:15 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] s390/mm: " Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 13:46 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-03 13:15 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] drm/ttm, drm/vmwgfx: Correctly support support AMD memory encryption Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 19:38 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2019-09-03 19:51 ` Daniel Vetter
2019-09-03 19:55 ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-03 20:36 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 20:51 ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-03 21:05 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 21:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-03 22:08 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 22:15 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 23:10 ` Dave Hansen
2019-09-04 8:34 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-04 6:49 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-04 7:53 ` Daniel Vetter
2019-09-04 10:37 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-04 11:43 ` Daniel Vetter
2019-09-04 18:16 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-09-04 7:33 ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-04 8:19 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-04 8:42 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-04 11:10 ` Koenig, Christian
2019-09-04 12:35 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-04 13:05 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 13:15 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] drm/ttm: Cache dma pool decrypted pages when AMD SEV is active Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-03 15:18 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] Have TTM support SEV encryption with coherent memory Daniel Vetter
2019-09-05 10:43 ` Thomas Hellström (VMware)
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