From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 12/18] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 20:44:07 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c0667fe89cf16144a4027a780426d4834d5a0c34.1511325444.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1511325444.git.luto@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1511325444.git.luto@kernel.org>
When we start using an entry trampoline, a #GP from userspace will
be delivered on the entry stack, not on the task stack. Fix the
espfix64 #DF fixup to set up #GP according to TSS.SP0, rather than
assuming that pt_regs + 1 == SP0. This won't change anything
without an entry stack, but it will make the code continue to work
when an entry stack is added.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 81841f27beff..1ea03027a4a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -358,7 +358,8 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
regs->cs == __KERNEL_CS &&
regs->ip == (unsigned long)native_irq_return_iret)
{
- struct pt_regs *normal_regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+ struct pt_regs *normal_regs =
+ (struct pt_regs *)this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0) - 1;
/* Fake a #GP(0) from userspace. */
memmove(&normal_regs->ip, (void *)regs->sp, 5*8);
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
*
* Processors update CR2 whenever a page fault is detected. If a
* second page fault occurs while an earlier page fault is being
- * deliv- ered, the faulting linear address of the second fault will
+ * delivered, the faulting linear address of the second fault will
* overwrite the contents of CR2 (replacing the previous
* address). These updates to CR2 occur even if the page fault
* results in a double fault or occurs during the delivery of a
--
2.13.6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-22 4:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-22 4:43 [PATCH v2 00/18] Entry stack switching Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:43 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] x86/entry/64: Fix entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe IRQ tracing Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 5:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-22 7:45 ` [tip:x86/urgent] x86/entry/64: Fix entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe() " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:43 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] x86/asm/64: Allocate and enable the SYSENTER stack Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:43 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for " Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 12:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-22 4:43 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] x86/gdt: Put per-cpu GDT remaps in ascending order Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 11:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-22 15:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] x86/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-22 17:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 17:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-23 15:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 19:24 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 6:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-22 9:05 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2017-11-22 15:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 10:08 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2017-11-23 15:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] x86/asm: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 19:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 11:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] x86/asm: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 12:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-23 13:16 ` Denys Vlasenko
2017-11-23 15:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 19:30 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] x86/asm: Remap the TSS into the cpu entry area Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 19:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-23 19:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-23 20:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 20:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-11-24 2:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-24 4:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] x86/asm/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 19:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-22 4:44 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2017-11-23 19:36 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] x86/asm/64: Use a percpu trampoline stack for IDT entries Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 23:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-24 4:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] x86/asm/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] x86/entry/64: Create a percpu SYSCALL entry trampoline Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] x86/irq: Remove an old outdated comment about context tracking races Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] x86/irq/64: In the stack overflow warning, print the offending IP Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 4:44 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into cpu_entry_area Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 6:22 ` [PATCH v2 00/18] Entry stack switching Ingo Molnar
2017-11-22 6:36 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-22 16:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 6:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-23 6:44 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-23 6:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-23 15:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-23 16:41 ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-11-22 7:39 ` WARNING: can't dereference registers at ffffc90004dfff60 for ip error_entry+0x7d/0xd0 (Re: [PATCH v2 00/18] Entry stack switching) Ingo Molnar
2017-11-22 7:43 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-22 13:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-11-22 15:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-11-22 15:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-11-22 16:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
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