From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v4 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2017 14:10:12 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fbfe9c21-ea5a-ad26-e26a-27d96b0a7d0a@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170917144147.GJ4733@nazgul.tnic>
On 09/17/2017 09:41 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>> + push %ebx
>> + push %ecx
>> + push %edx
>> + push %edi
>> +
>> + call 1f
>> +1: popl %edi
>> + subl $1b, %edi
>
> 32-bit RIP-relative addressing huh? :)
>
> It definitely deserves a comment.
>
Will add comment in next rev. thanks
-Brijesh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-26 19:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-16 12:34 [Part1 PATCH v4 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 15:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:06 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 11/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:10 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-26 19:08 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-09-17 15:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 15/17] percpu: introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_UNENCRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 3:13 ` Tejun Heo
2017-09-19 10:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 13:50 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-20 7:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-20 16:16 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 16/17] X86/KVM: Unencrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 11:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-19 14:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-20 7:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-16 12:34 ` [Part1 PATCH v4 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-19 11:47 ` Borislav Petkov
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