From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@linux-powerpc.org>,
"Tom Gundersen" <teg@jklm.no>, "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"David Herrmann" <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 08/10] fork: record start_time late
Date: Thu, 09 May 2019 15:08:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <lsq.1557410897.703932534@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <lsq.1557410896.171359878@decadent.org.uk>
3.16.67-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
commit 7b55851367136b1efd84d98fea81ba57a98304cf upstream.
This changes the fork(2) syscall to record the process start_time after
initializing the basic task structure but still before making the new
process visible to user-space.
Technically, we could record the start_time anytime during fork(2). But
this might lead to scenarios where a start_time is recorded long before
a process becomes visible to user-space. For instance, with
userfaultfd(2) and TLS, user-space can delay the execution of fork(2)
for an indefinite amount of time (and will, if this causes network
access, or similar).
By recording the start_time late, it much closer reflects the point in
time where the process becomes live and can be observed by other
processes.
Lastly, this makes it much harder for user-space to predict and control
the start_time they get assigned. Previously, user-space could fork a
process and stall it in copy_thread_tls() before its pid is allocated,
but after its start_time is recorded. This can be misused to later-on
cycle through PIDs and resume the stalled fork(2) yielding a process
that has the same pid and start_time as a process that existed before.
This can be used to circumvent security systems that identify processes
by their pid+start_time combination.
Even though user-space was always aware that start_time recording is
flaky (but several projects are known to still rely on start_time-based
identification), changing the start_time to be recorded late will help
mitigate existing attacks and make it much harder for user-space to
control the start_time a process gets assigned.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: start_time initialisation code is different]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
kernel/fork.c | 13 +++++++++++--
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1265,9 +1265,6 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(
posix_cpu_timers_init(p);
- do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
- p->real_start_time = p->start_time;
- monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time);
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
@@ -1423,6 +1420,18 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(
p->task_works = NULL;
/*
+ * From this point on we must avoid any synchronous user-space
+ * communication until we take the tasklist-lock. In particular, we do
+ * not want user-space to be able to predict the process start-time by
+ * stalling fork(2) after we recorded the start_time but before it is
+ * visible to the system.
+ */
+
+ do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
+ p->real_start_time = p->start_time;
+ monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time);
+
+ /*
* Make it visible to the rest of the system, but dont wake it up yet.
* Need tasklist lock for parent etc handling!
*/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-09 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-09 14:08 [PATCH 3.16 00/10] 3.16.67-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 14:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 04/10] spi: omap-100k: Remove unused definitions Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 14:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 10/10] percpu: stop printing kernel addresses Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 14:08 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2019-05-09 14:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 09/10] timer/debug: Change /proc/timer_stats from 0644 to 0600 Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 14:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 05/10] vxlan: Fix big-endian declaration of VNI Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 14:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 02/10] brcmfmac: add length checks in scheduled scan result handler Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 14:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 01/10] Revert "brcmfmac: assure SSID length from firmware is limited" Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 14:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 06/10] ipv4: fix a race in update_or_create_fnhe() Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 14:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 07/10] KVM: VMX: Fix x2apic check in vmx_msr_bitmap_mode() Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 14:08 ` [PATCH 3.16 03/10] inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards Ben Hutchings
2019-05-09 17:38 ` [PATCH 3.16 00/10] 3.16.67-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2019-05-09 19:00 ` Ben Hutchings
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