* [PATCH ipsec v4 1/9] xfrm: state: reject mark with bits outside its mask on add
2026-10-06 7:03 [PATCH ipsec v4 0/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
@ 2026-10-06 7:03 ` Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:04 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 2/9] xfrm: state: reject mark with bits outside its mask on ALLOCSPI Antony Antony
` (7 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Antony Antony @ 2026-10-06 7:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Antony Antony, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
David Ahern, Jamal Hadi Salim, Shuah Khan, Paul Chaignon,
Louis DeLosSantos, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Randy Dunlap
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, netdev, Yan Yan, Tobias Brunner,
Florian Westphal, linux-doc, linux-kernel, stable+noautosel
A mark/mask like 0x101/0xff is silently truncated to 0x01/0xff on
insert, so the exact-match lookups added later in this series (DELSA,
GETSA, GETAE, NEWAE, EXPIRE, MIGRATE_STATE) could not find the SA.
Reject it instead.
Fixes: 0b91fda3a1f0 ("xfrm: Sanitize marks before insert")
Cc: <stable+noautosel@kernel.org> # needs exact-match SA lookups from this series
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
v3->v4: added this patch
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 3 ---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index e45aa1ed5b96..602404ffc4d4 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -1732,9 +1732,6 @@ static void __xfrm_state_insert(struct xfrm_state *x)
list_add(&x->km.all, &net->xfrm.state_all);
- /* Sanitize mark before store */
- x->mark.v &= x->mark.m;
-
h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, &x->id.daddr, &x->props.saddr,
x->props.reqid, x->props.family);
XFRM_STATE_INSERT(bydst, &x->bydst,
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index a2587c7e796b..0723d791b8b7 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -314,6 +314,22 @@ static int verify_selector_prefixlen(u16 family,
}
}
+static int verify_mark(struct nlattr **attrs, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+ const struct xfrm_mark *m;
+
+ if (!attrs[XFRMA_MARK])
+ return 0;
+
+ m = nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_MARK]);
+ if ((m->v & m->m) != m->v) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid mark value/mask combination");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
struct nlattr **attrs,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
@@ -333,6 +349,10 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
if (err)
goto out;
+ err = verify_mark(attrs, extack);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
err = -EINVAL;
switch (p->id.proto) {
case IPPROTO_AH:
@@ -3370,6 +3390,10 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate_state(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
return err;
}
+ err = verify_mark(attrs, extack);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
copy_from_user_migrate_state(&m, um);
x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, m.old_mark.v & m.old_mark.m,
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH ipsec v4 2/9] xfrm: state: reject mark with bits outside its mask on ALLOCSPI
2026-10-06 7:03 [PATCH ipsec v4 0/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:03 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 1/9] xfrm: state: reject mark with bits outside its mask on add Antony Antony
@ 2026-10-06 7:04 ` Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:04 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 3/9] xfrm: policy: reject mark with bits outside its mask on add Antony Antony
` (6 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Antony Antony @ 2026-10-06 7:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Antony Antony, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
David Ahern, Jamal Hadi Salim, Shuah Khan, Paul Chaignon,
Louis DeLosSantos, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Randy Dunlap
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, netdev, Yan Yan, Tobias Brunner,
Florian Westphal, linux-doc, linux-kernel, stable+noautosel
__find_acq_core() stores the larval ACQUIRE mark raw, bypassing the
insert sanitize, so an invalid mark/mask can never match any later
masked lookup. Reject it at ALLOCSPI time instead.
Fixes: bd55775c8dd6 ("xfrm: SA lookups signature with mark")
Cc: <stable+noautosel@kernel.org> # avoid breaking existing userspace ABI
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
v3->v4: added this patch
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 0723d791b8b7..6b53373168b0 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1916,6 +1916,9 @@ static int xfrm_alloc_userspi(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
x = NULL;
+ err = verify_mark(attrs, extack);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_noput;
mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH ipsec v4 3/9] xfrm: policy: reject mark with bits outside its mask on add
2026-10-06 7:03 [PATCH ipsec v4 0/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:03 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 1/9] xfrm: state: reject mark with bits outside its mask on add Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:04 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 2/9] xfrm: state: reject mark with bits outside its mask on ALLOCSPI Antony Antony
@ 2026-10-06 7:04 ` Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:05 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 4/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for SPI-keyed control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
` (5 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Antony Antony @ 2026-10-06 7:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Antony Antony, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
David Ahern, Jamal Hadi Salim, Shuah Khan, Paul Chaignon,
Louis DeLosSantos, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Randy Dunlap
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, netdev, Yan Yan, Tobias Brunner,
Florian Westphal, linux-doc, linux-kernel, stable+noautosel
Same issue as states: an invalid mark/mask is silently truncated on
insert, so GETPOLICY and DELPOLICY can no longer find the policy by
id. Reject it instead.
Fixes: 0b91fda3a1f0 ("xfrm: Sanitize marks before insert")
Cc: <stable+noautosel@kernel.org> # avoid breaking existing userspace ABI
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
v3->v4: added this patch
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 6b53373168b0..c1571c7a2315 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -2307,6 +2307,9 @@ static int xfrm_add_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
if (err)
return err;
err = verify_sec_ctx_len(attrs, extack);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = verify_mark(attrs, extack);
if (err)
return err;
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH ipsec v4 4/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for SPI-keyed control-plane SA lookups
2026-10-06 7:03 [PATCH ipsec v4 0/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-10-06 7:04 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 3/9] xfrm: policy: reject mark with bits outside its mask on add Antony Antony
@ 2026-10-06 7:05 ` Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:05 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 5/9] xfrm: fix use-after-free of migrated state in xfrm_do_migrate_state() Antony Antony
` (4 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Antony Antony @ 2026-10-06 7:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Antony Antony, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
David Ahern, Jamal Hadi Salim, Shuah Khan, Paul Chaignon,
Louis DeLosSantos, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Randy Dunlap
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, netdev, Yan Yan, Tobias Brunner,
Florian Westphal, linux-doc, linux-kernel
Add __xfrm_state_lookup_exact(); wire it into DELSA/GETSA, GETAE/NEWAE,
EXPIRE, MIGRATE_STATE. xfrm_state_update() (UPDSA) keeps wildcard match
because ALLOCSPI's larval state may have mark (mask=0), so exact-match
UPDSA can't find it and the ADD fallback trips -EEXIST
via xfrm_state_add().
Fixes: 3d6acfa7641f ("xfrm: SA lookups with mark")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
v2->v3: mark match use only values and no mask fix typo
v1->v2: UPDSA keep the wildcard lookup
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 3 +++
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 29 +++++++++++++-------------
3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index a6d69aaa6cd2..9e053388aa4b 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1748,6 +1748,9 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct net *net, u32 mark,
const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
u8 proto,
unsigned short family);
+struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_exact(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi,
+ u8 proto, unsigned short family);
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
void xfrm_tmpl_sort(struct xfrm_tmpl **dst, struct xfrm_tmpl **src, int n,
unsigned short family);
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index 602404ffc4d4..f1e04df8d501 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -1177,11 +1177,19 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup_all(const struct xfrm_hash_state_p
return NULL;
}
-static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup(const struct xfrm_hash_state_ptrs *state_ptrs,
- u32 mark,
- const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
- __be32 spi, u8 proto,
- unsigned short family)
+static bool xfrm_state_mark_matches(const struct xfrm_state *x, u32 mark, u32 mask, bool exact)
+{
+ if (exact)
+ return x->mark.v == mark && x->mark.m == mask;
+ return (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v;
+}
+
+static struct xfrm_state *
+__xfrm_state_lookup(const struct xfrm_hash_state_ptrs *state_ptrs,
+ u32 mark, u32 mask, bool exact,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
+ __be32 spi, u8 proto,
+ unsigned short family)
{
unsigned int h = __xfrm_spi_hash(daddr, spi, proto, family, state_ptrs->hmask);
struct xfrm_state *x;
@@ -1193,7 +1201,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup(const struct xfrm_hash_state_ptrs
!xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, family))
continue;
- if ((mark & x->mark.m) != x->mark.v)
+ if (!xfrm_state_mark_matches(x, mark, mask, exact))
continue;
if (!xfrm_state_hold_rcu(x))
continue;
@@ -1203,6 +1211,17 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup(const struct xfrm_hash_state_ptrs
return NULL;
}
+static struct xfrm_state *
+__xfrm_state_lookup_exact(const struct xfrm_hash_state_ptrs *state_ptrs,
+ const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
+ __be32 spi, u8 proto,
+ unsigned short family)
+{
+ return __xfrm_state_lookup(state_ptrs, mark->v, mark->m, true,
+ daddr, spi, proto, family);
+}
+
struct xfrm_state *xfrm_input_state_lookup(struct net *net, u32 mark,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
__be32 spi, u8 proto,
@@ -1233,7 +1252,7 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_input_state_lookup(struct net *net, u32 mark,
xfrm_hash_ptrs_get(net, &state_ptrs);
- x = __xfrm_state_lookup(&state_ptrs, mark, daddr, spi, proto, family);
+ x = __xfrm_state_lookup(&state_ptrs, mark, 0, false, daddr, spi, proto, family);
if (x) {
spin_lock(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
if (x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID) {
@@ -1283,7 +1302,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(const struct xfrm_hash_stat
return NULL;
}
-static inline struct xfrm_state *
+static struct xfrm_state *
__xfrm_state_locate(struct xfrm_state *x, int use_spi, int family)
{
struct xfrm_hash_state_ptrs state_ptrs;
@@ -1293,7 +1312,7 @@ __xfrm_state_locate(struct xfrm_state *x, int use_spi, int family)
xfrm_hash_ptrs_get(net, &state_ptrs);
if (use_spi)
- return __xfrm_state_lookup(&state_ptrs, mark, &x->id.daddr,
+ return __xfrm_state_lookup(&state_ptrs, mark, 0, false, &x->id.daddr,
x->id.spi, x->id.proto, family);
else
return __xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(&state_ptrs, mark,
@@ -2380,7 +2399,7 @@ xfrm_state_lookup(struct net *net, u32 mark, const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32
rcu_read_lock();
xfrm_hash_ptrs_get(net, &state_ptrs);
- x = __xfrm_state_lookup(&state_ptrs, mark, daddr, spi, proto, family);
+ x = __xfrm_state_lookup(&state_ptrs, mark, 0, false, daddr, spi, proto, family);
rcu_read_unlock();
return x;
}
@@ -2404,6 +2423,23 @@ xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct net *net, u32 mark,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr);
+struct xfrm_state *
+xfrm_state_lookup_exact(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi,
+ u8 proto, unsigned short family)
+{
+ struct xfrm_hash_state_ptrs state_ptrs;
+ struct xfrm_state *x;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ xfrm_hash_ptrs_get(net, &state_ptrs);
+
+ x = __xfrm_state_lookup_exact(&state_ptrs, mark, daddr, spi, proto, family);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return x;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup_exact);
+
struct xfrm_state *
xfrm_find_acq(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u8 mode, u32 reqid,
u32 if_id, u32 pcpu_num, u8 proto, const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index c1571c7a2315..5a9f729b4fcb 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1109,11 +1109,12 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_user_state_lookup(struct net *net,
struct xfrm_state *x = NULL;
struct xfrm_mark m;
int err;
- u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
if (xfrm_id_proto_match(p->proto, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY)) {
err = -ESRCH;
- x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &p->daddr, p->spi, p->proto, p->family);
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_exact(net, &m, &p->daddr, p->spi, p->proto, p->family);
} else {
xfrm_address_t *saddr = NULL;
@@ -1124,7 +1125,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_user_state_lookup(struct net *net,
}
err = -ESRCH;
- x = xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, mark,
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, m.v & m.m,
&p->daddr, saddr,
p->proto, p->family);
}
@@ -2821,14 +2822,13 @@ static int xfrm_get_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct sk_buff *r_skb;
int err;
struct km_event c;
- u32 mark;
struct xfrm_mark m;
struct xfrm_aevent_id *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id = &p->sa_id;
- mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
- x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &id->daddr, id->spi, id->proto, id->family);
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_exact(net, &m, &id->daddr, id->spi, id->proto, id->family);
if (x == NULL)
return -ESRCH;
@@ -2869,7 +2869,6 @@ static int xfrm_new_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct km_event c;
int err = -EINVAL;
- u32 mark = 0;
struct xfrm_mark m;
struct xfrm_aevent_id *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct nlattr *rp = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL];
@@ -2889,9 +2888,10 @@ static int xfrm_new_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
return err;
}
- mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
- x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &p->sa_id.daddr, p->sa_id.spi, p->sa_id.proto, p->sa_id.family);
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_exact(net, &m, &p->sa_id.daddr, p->sa_id.spi,
+ p->sa_id.proto, p->sa_id.family);
if (x == NULL)
return -ESRCH;
@@ -3025,9 +3025,10 @@ static int xfrm_add_sa_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct xfrm_user_expire *ue = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p = &ue->state;
struct xfrm_mark m;
- u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
- x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &p->id.daddr, p->id.spi, p->id.proto, p->family);
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_exact(net, &m, &p->id.daddr, p->id.spi, p->id.proto, p->family);
err = -ENOENT;
if (x == NULL)
@@ -3402,9 +3403,9 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate_state(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
copy_from_user_migrate_state(&m, um);
- x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, m.old_mark.v & m.old_mark.m,
- &um->id.daddr, um->id.spi,
- um->id.proto, um->id.family);
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_exact(net, &m.old_mark,
+ &um->id.daddr, um->id.spi,
+ um->id.proto, um->id.family);
if (!x) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Can not find state");
return -ESRCH;
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH ipsec v4 5/9] xfrm: fix use-after-free of migrated state in xfrm_do_migrate_state()
2026-10-06 7:03 [PATCH ipsec v4 0/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-10-06 7:05 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 4/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for SPI-keyed control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
@ 2026-10-06 7:05 ` Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:06 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 6/9] xfrm: fix hw offload state leak on xfrm_do_migrate_state() error path Antony Antony
` (3 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Antony Antony @ 2026-10-06 7:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Antony Antony, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
David Ahern, Jamal Hadi Salim, Shuah Khan, Paul Chaignon,
Louis DeLosSantos, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Randy Dunlap
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, netdev, Yan Yan, Tobias Brunner,
Florian Westphal, linux-doc, linux-kernel, Sashiko
A concurrent delete can free the migrated state before
xfrm_do_migrate_state() finishes using it.
Fixes: a9d155ea9b44 ("xfrm: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE for single SA migration")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 5a9f729b4fcb..8640838dcda0 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -3509,6 +3509,7 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate_state(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
__xfrm_state_delete(x);
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
+ xfrm_state_hold(xc);
err = xfrm_state_migrate_install(x, xc, &m, extack);
if (err < 0) {
/*
@@ -3516,6 +3517,7 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate_state(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
* free under xfrm_cfg_mutex. Both SAs are gone if it does;
* restoring x would risk SN/IV reuse.
*/
+ xfrm_state_put(xc);
goto out;
}
@@ -3534,6 +3536,7 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate_state(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
err = 0;
}
+ xfrm_state_put(xc);
out:
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH ipsec v4 6/9] xfrm: fix hw offload state leak on xfrm_do_migrate_state() error path
2026-10-06 7:03 [PATCH ipsec v4 0/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2026-10-06 7:05 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 5/9] xfrm: fix use-after-free of migrated state in xfrm_do_migrate_state() Antony Antony
@ 2026-10-06 7:06 ` Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:06 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 7/9] xfrm: include mark in MIGRATE_STATE SA collision check Antony Antony
` (2 subsequent siblings)
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Antony Antony @ 2026-10-06 7:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Antony Antony, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
David Ahern, Jamal Hadi Salim, Shuah Khan, Paul Chaignon,
Louis DeLosSantos, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Randy Dunlap
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, netdev, Yan Yan, Tobias Brunner,
Florian Westphal, linux-doc, linux-kernel, Sashiko
In the error path, the cloned state is dropped without removing its
hardware offload, leaking the offloaded SA entry.
Fixes: a9d155ea9b44 ("xfrm: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE for single SA migration")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 8640838dcda0..4de8c401eb44 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -3541,6 +3541,8 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate_state(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
out_xc:
+ if (m.xuo)
+ xfrm_dev_state_delete(xc);
xc->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
xfrm_state_put(xc);
xfrm_state_put(x);
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH ipsec v4 7/9] xfrm: include mark in MIGRATE_STATE SA collision check
2026-10-06 7:03 [PATCH ipsec v4 0/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2026-10-06 7:06 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 6/9] xfrm: fix hw offload state leak on xfrm_do_migrate_state() error path Antony Antony
@ 2026-10-06 7:06 ` Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:06 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 8/9] xfrm: pass extack through to xfrm_init_replay() from xfrm_init_state() Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:06 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 9/9] docs: xfrm: include mark in XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE EEXIST tuple Antony Antony
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Antony Antony @ 2026-10-06 7:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Antony Antony, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
David Ahern, Jamal Hadi Salim, Shuah Khan, Paul Chaignon,
Louis DeLosSantos, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Randy Dunlap
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, netdev, Yan Yan, Tobias Brunner,
Florian Westphal, linux-doc, linux-kernel, Sashiko
The SA lookup tuple is (daddr, spi, proto, family, mark), but the
EEXIST pre-check and the xfrm_state_insert() vs xfrm_state_add()
decision only considered daddr and family, ignoring mark.
A migration that only changes the mark inserts a duplicate SA tuple
into the hash tables.
The collision check is implemented as xfrm_state_mark_collides(),
which walks the SPI hash bucket for the target tuple and excludes the
state being migrated by pointer, rather than doing a separate
exact-match lookup followed by a wildcard lookup and comparing the
result against self.
Before:
root@west:~# ip xfrm state add src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp \
spi 0x1000 reqid 100 mode tunnel aead "rfc4106(gcm(aes))" \
0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 \
mark 0x1 mask 0xff
root@west:~# ip xfrm state add src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp \
spi 0x1000 reqid 100 mode tunnel aead "rfc4106(gcm(aes))" \
0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 \
mark 0x2 mask 0xff
root@west:~# ip xfrm state migrate dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp spi 0x1000 \
mark 0x1 mask 0xff \
new-dst 10.1.1.2 new-src 10.1.1.1 new-reqid 100 \
new-mark 0x2 mask 0xff
ip x s
src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2
proto esp spi 0x00001000 reqid 100 mode tunnel
replay-window 0
mark 0x2/0xff
aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96
anti-replay context: seq 0x0, oseq 0x0, bitmap 0x00000000
src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2
proto esp spi 0x00001000 reqid 100 mode tunnel
replay-window 0
mark 0x2/0xff
aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96
anti-replay context: seq 0x0, oseq 0x0, bitmap 0x00000000
sel src 0.0.0.0/0 dst 0.0.0.0/0
Notice two states with same mark 0x2/0xff.
After:
Error: New SA tuple already occupied.
Fixes: a9d155ea9b44 ("xfrm: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE for single SA migration")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
v1->v2: pre-check used wildcard lookup; factored the check into
xfrm_state_mark_collides() excluding self directly instead of
lookup_exact()+lookup() with a pointer comparison
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 4 ++++
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 17 ++++++++---------
3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 9e053388aa4b..26dd4b570588 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1751,6 +1751,10 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct net *net, u32 mark,
struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_exact(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi,
u8 proto, unsigned short family);
+bool xfrm_state_mark_collides(struct net *net, u32 mark,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi,
+ u8 proto, unsigned short family,
+ const struct xfrm_state *self);
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
void xfrm_tmpl_sort(struct xfrm_tmpl **dst, struct xfrm_tmpl **src, int n,
unsigned short family);
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index f1e04df8d501..65663c7ba836 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -2202,10 +2202,12 @@ int xfrm_state_migrate_install(const struct xfrm_state *x,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
if (m->new_family == m->old_family &&
- xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, &m->new_daddr, m->new_family)) {
+ xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, &m->new_daddr, m->new_family) &&
+ xc->mark.v == x->mark.v && xc->mark.m == x->mark.m) {
/*
- * Care is needed when the destination address of the state is
- * to be updated as it is a part of triplet.
+ * Care is needed when the destination address or mark of the
+ * state is to be updated, as they are part of the lookup
+ * triplet.
*/
xfrm_state_insert(xc);
} else {
@@ -2440,6 +2442,38 @@ xfrm_state_lookup_exact(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup_exact);
+/* True if some OTHER state at this tuple would wildcard-match "mark".
+ * Used by MIGRATE_STATE, which must exclude the state being migrated.
+ */
+bool xfrm_state_mark_collides(struct net *net, u32 mark,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi,
+ u8 proto, unsigned short family,
+ const struct xfrm_state *self)
+{
+ struct xfrm_hash_state_ptrs state_ptrs;
+ unsigned int h;
+ struct xfrm_state *x;
+ bool collides = false;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ xfrm_hash_ptrs_get(net, &state_ptrs);
+ h = __xfrm_spi_hash(daddr, spi, proto, family, state_ptrs.hmask);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, state_ptrs.byspi + h, byspi) {
+ if (x != self && x->props.family == family &&
+ x->id.spi == spi && x->id.proto == proto &&
+ xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, family) &&
+ (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v) {
+ collides = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return collides;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_mark_collides);
+
struct xfrm_state *
xfrm_find_acq(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u8 mode, u32 reqid,
u32 if_id, u32 pcpu_num, u8 proto, const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 4de8c401eb44..a5fbe38839c4 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -3476,15 +3476,14 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate_state(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
x->nat_keepalive_interval);
if (m.new_family != um->id.family ||
- !xfrm_addr_equal(&m.new_daddr, &um->id.daddr, um->id.family)) {
- u32 new_mark_key = m.new_mark ? m.new_mark->v & m.new_mark->m :
- m.old_mark.v & m.old_mark.m;
- struct xfrm_state *x_new;
-
- x_new = xfrm_state_lookup(net, new_mark_key, &m.new_daddr,
- um->id.spi, um->id.proto, m.new_family);
- if (x_new) {
- xfrm_state_put(x_new);
+ !xfrm_addr_equal(&m.new_daddr, &um->id.daddr, um->id.family) ||
+ (m.new_mark && (m.new_mark->v != x->mark.v ||
+ m.new_mark->m != x->mark.m))) {
+ const struct xfrm_mark *new_mark = m.new_mark ? m.new_mark : &x->mark;
+
+ if (xfrm_state_mark_collides(net, new_mark->v & new_mark->m,
+ &m.new_daddr, um->id.spi,
+ um->id.proto, m.new_family, x)) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "New SA tuple already occupied");
err = -EEXIST;
goto out;
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH ipsec v4 8/9] xfrm: pass extack through to xfrm_init_replay() from xfrm_init_state()
2026-10-06 7:03 [PATCH ipsec v4 0/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2026-10-06 7:06 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 7/9] xfrm: include mark in MIGRATE_STATE SA collision check Antony Antony
@ 2026-10-06 7:06 ` Antony Antony
2026-10-06 7:06 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 9/9] docs: xfrm: include mark in XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE EEXIST tuple Antony Antony
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Antony Antony @ 2026-10-06 7:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Antony Antony, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
David Ahern, Jamal Hadi Salim, Shuah Khan, Paul Chaignon,
Louis DeLosSantos, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Randy Dunlap
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, netdev, Yan Yan, Tobias Brunner,
Florian Westphal, linux-doc, linux-kernel
xfrm_init_state() takes an extack parameter but doesn't pass it to
xfrm_init_replay(), so replay-window errors can't be reported via
extack.
Fixes: 231a1744dc43 ("xfrm: add extack to xfrm_init_state")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index 65663c7ba836..0555e5d796ed 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -3384,7 +3384,7 @@ int xfrm_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
if (err)
return err;
- err = xfrm_init_replay(x, NULL);
+ err = xfrm_init_replay(x, extack);
if (err)
return err;
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH ipsec v4 9/9] docs: xfrm: include mark in XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE EEXIST tuple
2026-10-06 7:03 [PATCH ipsec v4 0/9] xfrm: state: exact mark/mask match for control-plane SA lookups Antony Antony
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2026-10-06 7:06 ` [PATCH ipsec v4 8/9] xfrm: pass extack through to xfrm_init_replay() from xfrm_init_state() Antony Antony
@ 2026-10-06 7:06 ` Antony Antony
8 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Antony Antony @ 2026-10-06 7:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Antony Antony, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
David Ahern, Jamal Hadi Salim, Shuah Khan, Paul Chaignon,
Louis DeLosSantos, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Randy Dunlap
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, netdev, Yan Yan, Tobias Brunner,
Florian Westphal, linux-doc, linux-kernel
Document mark as part of the EEXIST tuple and update the SA lookup
description to match.
Fixes: c13c0cc6f52e ("xfrm: add documentation for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
---
.../networking/xfrm/xfrm_migrate_state.rst | 25 +++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/xfrm/xfrm_migrate_state.rst b/Documentation/networking/xfrm/xfrm_migrate_state.rst
index 9d53cb22b007..ca2c9e5aaf33 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/xfrm/xfrm_migrate_state.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/xfrm/xfrm_migrate_state.rst
@@ -27,15 +27,20 @@ SA Identification
=================
The struct is defined in ``include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h``. The SA is looked
-up using ``xfrm_state_lookup()`` with ``id.spi``,
-``id.daddr``, ``id.proto``, ``id.family``, and
-``old_mark.v & old_mark.m`` as the mark key::
+up using ``xfrm_state_lookup_exact()`` with ``id.spi``, ``id.daddr``,
+``id.proto``, ``id.family``, and an exact match against ``old_mark.v``
+and ``old_mark.m``. Unlike the data path, which uses a masked
+comparison, this requires the SA's mark and mask to equal ``old_mark``
+exactly, so a broad-mask SA is never matched when a more specific one
+was intended. If no such SA exists, ``-ESRCH`` is returned.
+
+The layout is::
struct xfrm_user_migrate_state {
struct xfrm_usersa_id id; /* spi, daddr, proto, family */
xfrm_address_t new_daddr;
xfrm_address_t new_saddr;
- struct xfrm_mark old_mark; /* SA lookup: key = v & m */
+ struct xfrm_mark old_mark; /* SA lookup key (exact v/m match) */
struct xfrm_selector new_sel; /* new selector (see Flags) */
__u32 new_reqid;
__u32 flags; /* XFRM_MIGRATE_STATE_* */
@@ -72,8 +77,8 @@ inherits the value from the existing SA (omit-to-inherit).
- Description
* - ``XFRMA_MARK``
- Mark on the migrated SA (``struct xfrm_mark``). Absent inherits
- ``old_mark``. To use no mark on the new SA, send ``XFRMA_MARK``
- with ``{0, 0}``.
+ the mark of the existing SA. To use no mark on the new SA, send
+ ``XFRMA_MARK`` with ``{0, 0}``.
* - ``XFRMA_ENCAP``
- UDP encapsulation template; only ``UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP`` is supported.
Set ``encap_type=0`` to remove encap.
@@ -259,8 +264,12 @@ Attributes in the notification
Error Handling
==============
-If the target SA tuple (new daddr, SPI, proto, new family) is already
-occupied, the operation returns ``-EEXIST`` before the migration begins.
+If the target SA tuple (new daddr, SPI, proto, new family, mark) is
+already occupied, the operation returns ``-EEXIST`` before the migration
+begins. "Occupied" includes wildcard shadowing: an existing SA with a
+broader mask (e.g. mark 0/0) claims every mark value, so it blocks
+migrating to any more specific mark at the same tuple, not just an
+exact mark/mask duplicate.
The old SA remains intact and the operation is safe to retry after
resolving the conflict.
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread