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From: tip-bot for Dan Williams <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: chunkeey@gmail.com, johannes@sipsolutions.net,
	tglx@linutronix.de, davem@davemloft.net, mingo@kernel.org,
	elena.reshetova@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:38:03 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

Commit-ID:  259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05
Author:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:15 -0800
Committer:  Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 21:54:32 +0100

nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params

Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that txq_params->ac
is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level driver's ->conf_tx()
handler is called. Use a new helper, array_index_nospec(), to sanitize
txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that any
speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of
txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS).

Reported-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
index 542a4fc..4bbcfc1 100644
--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/nl80211.h>
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
@@ -2056,20 +2057,22 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_params_policy[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
 static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[],
 			    struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params)
 {
+	u8 ac;
+
 	if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
+	ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
 	txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]);
 	txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]);
 	txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]);
 	txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]);
 
-	if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
+	if (ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
 		return -EINVAL;
-
+	txq_params->ac = array_index_nospec(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS);
 	return 0;
 }
 

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-30 22:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-30  1:02 [PATCH v6 00/13] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] Documentation: document array_index_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:33   ` [tip:x86/pti] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec tip-bot for Mark Rutland
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34   ` [tip:x86/pti] array_index_nospec: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-16  8:55   ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize " Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] x86: implement array_index_mask_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] x86: introduce barrier_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] x86, usercopy: replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/usercopy: Replace " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/get_user: Use " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:02 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] x86: sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/syscall: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:03 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37   ` [tip:x86/pti] vfs, fdtable: Prevent " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30  1:03 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-31  3:22   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-31  8:07     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-31 13:49       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 15:42         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30  1:03 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38   ` tip-bot for Dan Williams [this message]
2018-01-30  1:03 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/spectre: Report " tip-bot for Dan Williams

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