From: tip-bot for Dan Williams <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
dan.j.williams@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com, mingo@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, elena.reshetova@intel.com
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:37:38 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151727418500.33451.17392199002892248656.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
Commit-ID: 56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507
Author: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:05 -0800
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 21:54:32 +0100
vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to
read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of
kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from
__fcheck_files.
Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727418500.33451.17392199002892248656.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
---
include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h
index 1c65817..41615f3 100644
--- a/include/linux/fdtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -82,8 +83,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned i
{
struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt);
- if (fd < fdt->max_fds)
+ if (fd < fdt->max_fds) {
+ fd = array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds);
return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]);
+ }
return NULL;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-30 22:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-30 1:02 [PATCH v6 00/13] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] Documentation: document array_index_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:33 ` [tip:x86/pti] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec tip-bot for Mark Rutland
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34 ` [tip:x86/pti] array_index_nospec: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-16 8:55 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize " Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] x86: implement array_index_mask_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] x86: introduce barrier_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] x86, usercopy: replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/usercopy: Replace " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/get_user: Use " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] x86: sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/syscall: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37 ` tip-bot for Dan Williams [this message]
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-31 3:22 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-31 8:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-31 13:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 15:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38 ` [tip:x86/pti] nl80211: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/spectre: Report " tip-bot for Dan Williams
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