From: tip-bot for Dan Williams <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jslaby@suse.cz, dan.j.williams@intel.com, mingo@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de
Subject: [tip:x86/pti] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 14:38:29 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
Commit-ID: edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360
Author: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 17:03:21 -0800
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitDate: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 21:54:32 +0100
x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 400c34e..fdb6068 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-30 22:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-30 1:02 [PATCH v6 00/13] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] Documentation: document array_index_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:33 ` [tip:x86/pti] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec tip-bot for Mark Rutland
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34 ` [tip:x86/pti] array_index_nospec: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-16 8:55 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize " Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] x86: implement array_index_mask_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:34 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] x86: introduce barrier_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] x86, usercopy: replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:35 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/usercopy: Replace " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:36 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/get_user: Use " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:02 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] x86: sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/syscall: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:37 ` [tip:x86/pti] vfs, fdtable: Prevent " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-31 3:22 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-31 8:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-31 13:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 15:42 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38 ` [tip:x86/pti] nl80211: Sanitize " tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-01-30 1:03 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Dan Williams
2018-01-30 22:38 ` tip-bot for Dan Williams [this message]
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