mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Kuppuswamy,
	Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/14] x86/sev: Hide SVSM attestation entries if not running under an SVSM
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 09:05:10 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <112a1681-70d4-4826-b0b4-a0ff84750f9a@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <fff67373-9c46-4023-8af9-70e62b9ab97c@intel.com>

On 3/23/24 12:24, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan wrote:
> 
> On 3/8/24 10:35 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Config-fs provides support to hide individual attribute entries. Using
>> this support, base the display of the SVSM related entries on the presence
>> of an SVSM.
>>
>> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
>> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/coco/core.c        |  4 ++++
>>   drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c     | 13 +++++++++----
>>   include/linux/cc_platform.h |  8 ++++++++
>>   3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
>> index d07be9d05cd0..efa0f648f754 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
>> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>>   
>>   #include <asm/coco.h>
>>   #include <asm/processor.h>
>> +#include <asm/sev.h>
>>   
>>   enum cc_vendor cc_vendor __ro_after_init = CC_VENDOR_NONE;
>>   u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init;
>> @@ -78,6 +79,9 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
>>   	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT:
>>   		return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
>>   
>> +	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT:
>> +		return snp_get_vmpl();
>> +
>>   	/*
>>   	 * With SEV, the rep string I/O instructions need to be unrolled
>>   	 * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
>> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
>> index 07b4c95ce704..2efa6e578477 100644
>> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
>> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
>> @@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ static struct tsm_report_state *to_state(struct tsm_report *report)
>>   	return container_of(report, struct tsm_report_state, report);
>>   }
>>   
>> +static umode_t svsm_visibility(const struct config_item *item, const struct configfs_attribute *attr)
>> +{
>> +	return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT) ? attr->ca_mode : 0;
>> +}
>> +
> 
> Instead of directly checking for CC flags here, I am wondering if it would make
> sense to add a callback to vendor drivers and let the callback decide whether
> the attribute is valid or not? We can't add a CC flag for every ConfigFS attribute,
> right? For example, privlevel is not used by TDX. If there is a callback, then
> TDX driver can make this attribute invalid for it.

I think that's something that can be looked at after this series.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
>>   static int try_advance_write_generation(struct tsm_report *report)
>>   {
>>   	struct tsm_report_state *state = to_state(report);
>> @@ -139,7 +144,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_svsm_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>>   
>>   	return len;
>>   }
>> -CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, svsm);
>> +CONFIGFS_ATTR_VISIBLE_WO(tsm_report_, svsm, svsm_visibility);
>>   
>>   static ssize_t tsm_report_service_guid_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>>   					     const char *buf, size_t len)
>> @@ -168,7 +173,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_service_guid_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>>   
>>   	return len;
>>   }
>> -CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_guid);
>> +CONFIGFS_ATTR_VISIBLE_WO(tsm_report_, service_guid, svsm_visibility);
>>   
>>   static ssize_t tsm_report_service_manifest_version_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>>   							 const char *buf, size_t len)
>> @@ -189,7 +194,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_service_manifest_version_store(struct config_item *cfg
>>   
>>   	return len;
>>   }
>> -CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_manifest_version);
>> +CONFIGFS_ATTR_VISIBLE_WO(tsm_report_, service_manifest_version, svsm_visibility);
>>   
>>   static ssize_t tsm_report_inblob_write(struct config_item *cfg,
>>   				       const void *buf, size_t count)
>> @@ -336,7 +341,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_manifestblob_read(struct config_item *cfg, void *buf,
>>   
>>   	return tsm_report_read(report, buf, count, TSM_MANIFEST);
>>   }
>> -CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, manifestblob, NULL, TSM_OUTBLOB_MAX);
>> +CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_VISIBLE_RO(tsm_report_, manifestblob, NULL, TSM_OUTBLOB_MAX, svsm_visibility);
>>   
>>   #define TSM_DEFAULT_ATTRS() \
>>   	&tsm_report_attr_generation, \
>> diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
>> index cb0d6cd1c12f..f1b4266c1484 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
>> @@ -90,6 +90,14 @@ enum cc_attr {
>>   	 * Examples include TDX Guest.
>>   	 */
>>   	CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED,
>> +
>> +	/**
>> +	 * @CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT: Guest is running under an SVSM
>> +	 *
>> +	 * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine and is
>> +	 * running under a Secure VM Service Module (SVSM).
>> +	 */
>> +	CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT,
>>   };
>>   
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-25 14:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-08 18:35 [PATCH v2 00/14] Provide SEV-SNP support for " Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 01/14] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2024-03-10 21:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-11 16:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 02/14] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking function more generic Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 03/14] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-03-09  0:33   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-03-11 14:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 05/14] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 07/14] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 08/14] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 09/14] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 10/14] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 11/14] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-10  6:06   ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-11 16:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-12  5:57       ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-12 13:29         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 12/14] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-03-11 19:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-13 21:37   ` Joel Becker
2024-03-14 14:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-21  2:40       ` Dan Williams
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 13/14] x86/sev: Hide SVSM attestation entries if not running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-23 17:24   ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-25 14:05     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-03-26  1:10       ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=112a1681-70d4-4826-b0b4-a0ff84750f9a@amd.com \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=ashish.kalra@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hch@lst.de \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jlbec@evilplan.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®