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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 03/14] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 09:50:29 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <44d0311f-9c7d-4b47-8b09-a56d3283c1c6@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAAH4kHaMWeE65WKRUpf7rho0wNbSjgGUe4wOyX8y+5fyrwSiAQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 3/8/24 18:33, Dionna Amalie Glaze wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 8, 2024 at 10:36 AM Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>>
>> During early boot phases, check for the presence of an SVSM when running
>> as an SEV-SNP guest.
>>
>> An SVSM is present if the 64-bit value at offset 0x148 into the secrets
>> page is non-zero. If an SVSM is present, save the SVSM Calling Area
>> address (CAA), located at offset 0x150 into the secrets page, and set
>> the VMPL level of the guest, which should be non-zero, to indicate the
>> presence of an SVSM.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c    | 35 ++++++++---------
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h |  4 ++
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h        | 25 +++++++++++-
>>   arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c      | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   arch/x86/kernel/sev.c             | 16 ++++++++
>>   5 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>>

>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Maintain the GPA of the SVSM Calling Area (CA) in order to utilize the SVSM
>> + * services needed when not runnuing in VMPL0.
> 
> running*
> 
> otherwise lgtm

Will fix.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-11 14:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-08 18:35 [PATCH v2 00/14] Provide SEV-SNP support for running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 01/14] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2024-03-10 21:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-11 16:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 02/14] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking function more generic Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 03/14] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-03-09  0:33   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-03-11 14:50     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 05/14] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 07/14] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 08/14] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 09/14] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 10/14] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 11/14] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-10  6:06   ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-11 16:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-12  5:57       ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-12 13:29         ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 12/14] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-03-11 19:58   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-13 21:37   ` Joel Becker
2024-03-14 14:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-21  2:40       ` Dan Williams
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 13/14] x86/sev: Hide SVSM attestation entries if not running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-23 17:24   ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-25 14:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-26  1:10       ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky

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