From: "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@intel.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/14] x86/sev: Hide SVSM attestation entries if not running under an SVSM
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2024 10:24:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fff67373-9c46-4023-8af9-70e62b9ab97c@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <fabdf811d27a2539d1d016f75d95910b9bca24c4.1709922929.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
On 3/8/24 10:35 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Config-fs provides support to hide individual attribute entries. Using
> this support, base the display of the SVSM related entries on the presence
> of an SVSM.
>
> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/coco/core.c | 4 ++++
> drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c | 13 +++++++++----
> include/linux/cc_platform.h | 8 ++++++++
> 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> index d07be9d05cd0..efa0f648f754 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>
> #include <asm/coco.h>
> #include <asm/processor.h>
> +#include <asm/sev.h>
>
> enum cc_vendor cc_vendor __ro_after_init = CC_VENDOR_NONE;
> u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init;
> @@ -78,6 +79,9 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
> case CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT:
> return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED;
>
> + case CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT:
> + return snp_get_vmpl();
> +
> /*
> * With SEV, the rep string I/O instructions need to be unrolled
> * but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
> index 07b4c95ce704..2efa6e578477 100644
> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
> @@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ static struct tsm_report_state *to_state(struct tsm_report *report)
> return container_of(report, struct tsm_report_state, report);
> }
>
> +static umode_t svsm_visibility(const struct config_item *item, const struct configfs_attribute *attr)
> +{
> + return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT) ? attr->ca_mode : 0;
> +}
> +
Instead of directly checking for CC flags here, I am wondering if it would make
sense to add a callback to vendor drivers and let the callback decide whether
the attribute is valid or not? We can't add a CC flag for every ConfigFS attribute,
right? For example, privlevel is not used by TDX. If there is a callback, then
TDX driver can make this attribute invalid for it.
> static int try_advance_write_generation(struct tsm_report *report)
> {
> struct tsm_report_state *state = to_state(report);
> @@ -139,7 +144,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_svsm_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>
> return len;
> }
> -CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, svsm);
> +CONFIGFS_ATTR_VISIBLE_WO(tsm_report_, svsm, svsm_visibility);
>
> static ssize_t tsm_report_service_guid_store(struct config_item *cfg,
> const char *buf, size_t len)
> @@ -168,7 +173,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_service_guid_store(struct config_item *cfg,
>
> return len;
> }
> -CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_guid);
> +CONFIGFS_ATTR_VISIBLE_WO(tsm_report_, service_guid, svsm_visibility);
>
> static ssize_t tsm_report_service_manifest_version_store(struct config_item *cfg,
> const char *buf, size_t len)
> @@ -189,7 +194,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_service_manifest_version_store(struct config_item *cfg
>
> return len;
> }
> -CONFIGFS_ATTR_WO(tsm_report_, service_manifest_version);
> +CONFIGFS_ATTR_VISIBLE_WO(tsm_report_, service_manifest_version, svsm_visibility);
>
> static ssize_t tsm_report_inblob_write(struct config_item *cfg,
> const void *buf, size_t count)
> @@ -336,7 +341,7 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_manifestblob_read(struct config_item *cfg, void *buf,
>
> return tsm_report_read(report, buf, count, TSM_MANIFEST);
> }
> -CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, manifestblob, NULL, TSM_OUTBLOB_MAX);
> +CONFIGFS_BIN_ATTR_VISIBLE_RO(tsm_report_, manifestblob, NULL, TSM_OUTBLOB_MAX, svsm_visibility);
>
> #define TSM_DEFAULT_ATTRS() \
> &tsm_report_attr_generation, \
> diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
> index cb0d6cd1c12f..f1b4266c1484 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
> @@ -90,6 +90,14 @@ enum cc_attr {
> * Examples include TDX Guest.
> */
> CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED,
> +
> + /**
> + * @CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT: Guest is running under an SVSM
> + *
> + * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine and is
> + * running under a Secure VM Service Module (SVSM).
> + */
> + CC_ATTR_GUEST_SVSM_PRESENT,
> };
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
--
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Linux Kernel Developer
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-23 17:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-08 18:35 [PATCH v2 00/14] Provide SEV-SNP support for " Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 01/14] x86/sev: Rename snp_init() in the boot/compressed/sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2024-03-10 21:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-03-11 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 02/14] x86/sev: Make the VMPL0 checking function more generic Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 03/14] x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP Secrets page Tom Lendacky
2024-03-09 0:33 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-03-11 14:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 04/14] x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 05/14] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0 Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 07/14] x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 08/14] x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 09/14] virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 10/14] configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 11/14] x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-10 6:06 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-11 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-12 5:57 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-12 13:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 12/14] fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility Tom Lendacky
2024-03-11 19:58 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-13 21:37 ` Joel Becker
2024-03-14 14:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-21 2:40 ` Dan Williams
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 13/14] x86/sev: Hide SVSM attestation entries if not running under an SVSM Tom Lendacky
2024-03-23 17:24 ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan [this message]
2024-03-25 14:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-03-26 1:10 ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-08 18:35 ` [PATCH v2 14/14] x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present Tom Lendacky
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