From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jwboyer@redhat.com,
keescook@chromium.org,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 03/10] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is enabled
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 12:10:12 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1376928619-3775-3-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1376928619-3775-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
it down by default.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 5 +++--
drivers/char/mem.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 4ddaf66..00b4403 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/bitmap.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/syscalls.h>
/*
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
return -EINVAL;
- if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules()))
return -EPERM;
/*
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
return -EINVAL;
/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
if (level > old) {
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || secure_modules())
return -EPERM;
}
regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index f895a8c..1af8664 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/aio.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -563,6 +564,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
unsigned long i = *ppos;
const char __user *tmp = buf;
+ if (secure_modules())
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-19 16:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-19 16:10 [PATCH 01/10] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 02/10] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 04/10] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 17:58 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 05/10] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:20 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-19 17:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 18:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-29 18:35 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 18:46 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-29 18:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 19:05 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-29 19:07 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 19:28 ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 06/10] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 07/10] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Matthew Garrett
2013-09-01 8:52 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 09/10] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 10/10] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
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