From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jwboyer@redhat.com,
keescook@chromium.org,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 12:10:17 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1376928619-3775-8-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1376928619-3775-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes
sense to disable kexec in this situation.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
kernel/kexec.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 59f7b55..1a7690f 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -1645,6 +1646,9 @@ int kernel_kexec(void)
goto Unlock;
}
+ if (secure_modules())
+ return -EPERM;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (kexec_image->preserve_context) {
lock_system_sleep();
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-08-19 16:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-08-19 16:10 [PATCH 01/10] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 02/10] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 03/10] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 04/10] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 17:58 ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 05/10] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:20 ` Kees Cook
2013-08-19 17:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 18:22 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-29 18:35 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 18:46 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-29 18:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 19:05 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-29 19:07 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 19:28 ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 06/10] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 07/10] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2013-09-01 8:52 ` [PATCH 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Geert Uytterhoeven
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 09/10] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 16:10 ` [PATCH 10/10] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1376928619-3775-8-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
--to=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
--cc=jwboyer@redhat.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
Powered by JetHome