From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
hpa@zytor.com, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when trusted_kernel is true
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 11:38:25 -1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1426282708-21485-10-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1426282708-21485-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
uswsusp allows a user process to dump and then restore kernel state, which
makes it possible to modify the running kernel. Disable this if
trusted_kernel is true.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
kernel/power/user.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c
index 526e891..43b7b59 100644
--- a/kernel/power/user.c
+++ b/kernel/power/user.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ static int snapshot_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
struct snapshot_data *data;
int error;
- if (!hibernation_available())
+ if (get_trusted_kernel() || !hibernation_available())
return -EPERM;
lock_system_sleep();
--
2.1.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-03-13 21:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-03-13 21:38 Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down register access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable loading of unverified images Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2015-03-16 21:36 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when trusted_kernel is true Kees Cook
2015-03-16 21:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2015-04-22 11:36 ` Dan Carpenter
2015-03-15 1:53 ` Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 14:45 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 18:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 20:07 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 20:35 ` David Lang
2015-03-16 20:57 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 21:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 21:29 ` Kees Cook
2015-03-17 17:48 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-17 20:22 ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-17 20:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-18 11:34 ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-16 21:54 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-03-18 13:24 ` joeyli
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2014-02-26 20:11 Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek
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