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From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: David Lang <david@lang.hm>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>,
	"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"james.l.morris@oracle.com" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"serge@hallyn.com" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 20:57:32 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150316205732.1d82a9dd@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.02.1503161333140.32001@nftneq.ynat.uz>

> Anything that encourages deploying systems that can't be upgraded to fix bugs 
> that are discovered is a problem.
> 
> This is an issue that the Internet of Things folks are just starting to notice, 
> and it's only going to get worse before it gets better.
> 
> How do you patch bugs on your non-volitile media? What keeps that mechansim from 
> being abused.

One example is flash memory that can only be written by a special part of
the system which verifies the signatures then writes the data to the
flash. That to most intents and purposes is "non volatile". In some
environments jumpers or particular sequences of holding buttons in may
deal with it - if they are handled such that malicious software cannot do
it.

Some systems go further than that and do measure the boot path - so
modern x86 firmware will typically not allow you to flash the BIOS
firmware except from measured firmware, and won't run the result without
checking signatures. Not everything goes that far.

The IoT and general security underfunding is a social and economic issue
however, and isn't soluble by technical means. It will be fixed when the
lawmakers finally stop listening to the lobbyists, or when something
*really bad* happens and they extend liability law to paid services and
licensed components of sold products on the back of either some massive
disruptive hack or serious loss of life.

Alan

  reply	other threads:[~2015-03-16 20:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-03-13 21:38 Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down register access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable loading of unverified images Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 21:36   ` Kees Cook
2015-03-16 21:40     ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2015-04-22 11:36   ` Dan Carpenter
2015-03-15  1:53 ` Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 14:45 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 18:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 20:07     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 20:35     ` David Lang
2015-03-16 20:57       ` One Thousand Gnomes [this message]
2015-03-16 21:11       ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 21:29     ` Kees Cook
2015-03-17 17:48       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-17 20:22       ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-17 20:42         ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-18 11:34           ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-16 21:54     ` Jiri Kosina
2015-03-18 13:24       ` joeyli

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