mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port access when trusted_kernel is true
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 11:38:20 -1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1426282708-21485-5-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1426282708-21485-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
it down when trusted_kernel is true

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 5 +++--
 drivers/char/mem.c       | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 4ddaf66..3121541 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
 /*
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
 
 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || (get_trusted_kernel())))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
 	if (level > old) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || (get_trusted_kernel()))
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 297110c..74227cd 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/aio.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -559,6 +560,9 @@ static ssize_t read_port(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long i = *ppos;
 	char __user *tmp = buf;
 
+	if (get_trusted_kernel())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
@@ -577,6 +581,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long i = *ppos;
 	const char __user *tmp = buf;
 
+	if (get_trusted_kernel())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
-- 
2.1.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-03-13 21:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-03-13 21:38 Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down register access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable loading of unverified images Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 21:36   ` Kees Cook
2015-03-16 21:40     ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2015-04-22 11:36   ` Dan Carpenter
2015-03-15  1:53 ` Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 14:45 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 18:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 20:07     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 20:35     ` David Lang
2015-03-16 20:57       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 21:11       ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 21:29     ` Kees Cook
2015-03-17 17:48       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-17 20:22       ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-17 20:42         ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-18 11:34           ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-16 21:54     ` Jiri Kosina
2015-03-18 13:24       ` joeyli
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2014-02-26 20:11 Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1426282708-21485-5-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    --to=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    --cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=james.l.morris@oracle.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®