mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	hpa@zytor.com, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down register access when trusted_kernel is true
Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2015 11:38:19 -1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1426282708-21485-4-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1426282708-21485-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down from
userspace in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify
kernel code. This should be prevented if trusted_kernel has been set, so
this patch disables userspace access to PCI regions and config access.
In future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated
devices.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++
 drivers/pci/proc.c      | 9 ++++++++-
 drivers/pci/syscall.c   | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 312f23a..7348ed7 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -710,6 +710,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	loff_t init_off = off;
 	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
 
+	if (get_trusted_kernel())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
 		return 0;
 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -1004,6 +1007,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
 	resource_size_t start, end;
 	int i;
 
+	if (get_trusted_kernel())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++)
 		if (res == &pdev->resource[i])
 			break;
@@ -1105,6 +1111,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
 				     loff_t off, size_t count)
 {
+	if (get_trusted_kernel())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 3f155e7..701ff1a 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include "pci.h"
@@ -116,6 +117,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int size = dev->cfg_size;
 	int cnt;
 
+	if (get_trusted_kernel())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (pos >= size)
 		return 0;
 	if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -195,6 +199,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (get_trusted_kernel())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -233,7 +240,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
 	int i, ret;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || (get_trusted_kernel()))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */
diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
index b91c4da..95bcbc5 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "pci.h"
 
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
 	u32 dword;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (get_trusted_kernel()))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
-- 
2.1.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-03-13 21:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-03-13 21:38 Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable loading of unverified images Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 21:36   ` Kees Cook
2015-03-16 21:40     ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2015-03-13 21:38 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2015-04-22 11:36   ` Dan Carpenter
2015-03-15  1:53 ` Trusted kernel patchset Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 14:45 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 18:15   ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 20:07     ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 20:35     ` David Lang
2015-03-16 20:57       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-16 21:11       ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-16 21:29     ` Kees Cook
2015-03-17 17:48       ` One Thousand Gnomes
2015-03-17 20:22       ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-17 20:42         ` Matthew Garrett
2015-03-18 11:34           ` Simon McVittie
2015-03-16 21:54     ` Jiri Kosina
2015-03-18 13:24       ` joeyli

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1426282708-21485-4-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    --to=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    --cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=james.l.morris@oracle.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®